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The procurement process is designed to be a three-way relationship between the buying 
command(s), the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and the Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA). Over the last 40 years, these entities have evolved 
independently of one another. Many of the re-organizations and policy changes were not 
coordinated outside the organizations, and as a result, the current working relationship 
between these entities is not at an optimal level. For DOD program managers, a working 
knowledge of these organizations is critical to delivering projects on time and on budget.   
To assist program managers in creating a more effective and efficient acquisition 
cycle, we propose a joint-applied-project through NPS to address the following: 
 Research the original intent of the three organizations and map out the intended 
workflow/responsibilities within the acquisition mission. 
 Research and document major changes in the evolution of each agency over the 
past 40 years. 
 Apply Lean six-sigma principles to the DOD Acquisition team organization and 
processes, including: 
a. Develop a responsibility/process map for the three agencies based on 
current policies. 
b. Review our findings for overlap/redundancy, miscommunication, and 
other opportunities efficiency improvement within the acquisition process. 
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Since 1965, Department of Defense (DOD) commands, the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA), and the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) have 
been tasked by Congress to work together to support the DOD and the warfighter. 
Specifically: 
 Buying commands consist of contracting officers (and staff) authorized to 
enter into binding commitments on behalf of the U.S. government. 
Multiple commands exist within each service branch of the DOD, and are 
tasked with obtaining the supplies, assets and services required by their 
respective departments. Buying commands are responsible for 
constructing and publishing requests for proposals, awarding contracts, 
setting rates and making any binding decision regarding the contract 
(including payments and terminations). 
 The DCAA was established in 1965 by a directive of the DOD for the 
purpose of performing all contract auditing services for the Department of 
Defense and providing accounting and financial advisory services, in 
connection with the negotiation, administration, and settlement of 
contracts and subcontracts, to all DOD procurement and contract 
administration activities.  
 The DCMA provides contract administration services to the Department 
of Defense Acquisition Enterprise and its partners to ensure delivery of 
quality products and services to the warfighter; on time and on cost. This 
includes assistance constructing effective solicitations, identifying 
potential risks, selecting the most capable contractors, and writing 
contracts, setting rates, as well as monitoring contracts already awarded. 
Over the last 40 years, these entities have evolved independently of one another. 
Many of the reorganizations and policy changes were not coordinated outside the 
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organizations, and as a result these three critical elements of the acquisition team work 
independently alongside one another rather than working in symphony to deliver a 
common objective to the warfighter. For DOD program managers, a working knowledge 
of these organizations is critical to delivering projects on time and on budget.  
B. PURPOSE 
The overall purpose of our research is to develop a comprehensive understanding 
of the role each of the three agencies play in the overall acquisition process, and to 
examine the relationships between them. To accomplish this objective, we will apply the 
Lean Six-Sigma framework to: 
 identify the key business processes within the overall DOD acquisition 
process, 
 observe the current process flow,  
 analyze the current process flow for efficiency opportunities, and 
 improvements to the acquisition process with respect to delivering 
products to the warfighter on-time and on-cost. 
 
We began by performing in-depth research into the mission, history and current 
challenges of each organization. We then examined the overall acquisition process, as 
detailed on the Integrated Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle 
Management System (commonly referred to as the “Horseblanket Chart,” or “Horse 
Chart”), and determined where each organization’s various responsibilities fit into the 
overall process. Using the “Chart” as a tool, we outlined the acquisition process 
workflow, identifying the contract life cycle as the key driver of the process. We then 
applied Lean Six-Sigma principles to the contract life cycle, specifically analyzing the 
interrelationship between buying commands, DCMA and DCAA. The results from this 
study will hopefully contribute to the ongoing conversation within the DOD Acquisition 
community regarding ever shuffling priorities and mismatched objectives in the present 
era of sequestration and shrinking budgets. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our research provided us with sufficient background data to answer the following 
primary and secondary questions: 
Primary 
1) Where does everyone fit into the overall acquisition process? 
Secondary 
2) What is the key business process that drives the overall acquisition? 
3) What is each agency’s role? 
4) How to the agencies interact? 
5) Are there opportunities for increased efficiency? 
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
The information we researched and reviewed will help in understanding and 
analyzing the various entities involved in the acquisition process. Our research should 
establish a basis for further, more detailed inquiries into the relationships between 
acquisition agencies and their contribution to the process as a whole. The overall intent of 
our research is to substantiate the theory that while each component of the acquisition 
process operates independently, efficiencies may be gained by viewing each entity as an 
element of a larger “acquisition team,” bonded by a common goal. 
The five branches within the Department of Defense consist of hundreds of 
separate Commands. These Commands conduct business daily with hundreds of DCAA 
and DCMA offices, as well as with thousands of contractors. We have no intent to 
provide a statistical sample of these transactions; however we have obtained some readily 
accessible actual data to use as examples of the business process we researched. 
Additionally, we limited our review of “buying command” activity to Air Force Space 
Command to serve as an example of a typical command’s activity. As our research is 
qualitative rather than quantitative in nature, we do not have a statistical sampling plan. 
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Human Subject Research was not used in the performance of this study. No 
interviews of DOD personnel were conducted or relied on during our research. All 
feedback and performance data obtained was gathered by the agencies themselves and 
readily available for official use by request from the respective Agency representative. 
The opinions expressed herein reflect the conclusions drawn by the authors based on our 
research, education and experience. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 
This report is organized into four chapters. Chapter I provides introductory 
information for the research, including: background and purpose for the research, primary 
questions that the research aims to answer, and the benefits and limitations. Chapter II 
explores current and historic literature and data gathered on DOD acquisition, which 
includes reports from the GAO, the DoDIG, DCAA, DCMA, and Air Force Space 
Command. Chapter III presents the authors’ analysis of the data gathered. Chapter IV 
consists of a summary of the research, conclusions, recommendations, and areas for 
future study. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter provided background information on the DOD acquisition process. It 
also described the purpose of our research, the primary research questions for the study, 
and benefits and limitations of the research. The next chapter reviews current literature in 
the area of services acquisition. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we review a collection of background literature, including primary 
source documentation published by the DCAA, DCMA, Air Force, GAO, DoDIG, and 
Defense industry publications. The purpose of this review is to gain a better 
understanding of the purposes, plans, and current state of each of the three entities 
covered by this study. The chapter is divided by organizations- DCAA, DCMA and 
finally the U.S. Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC). For each entity, we 
will examine the responsibilities, programmed focus, strategic plan and recent events 
impacting the organization.  
B. DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY 
1. DCAA Responsibilities and Primary Function 
Operating under the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the DCAA has 
been tasked with providing audit and financial advisory services to the DOD. The agency 
also provides these services to other federal entities responsible for acquisition and 
contract administration, on a cost-reimbursable basis. The intent of DCAA’s services is to 
ensure customers are receiving the best value for dollars spent. For example, DCAA 
performs audits of proposals received by SMC. Based on the costs questioned in DCAA’s 
audit report, SMC may negotiate a lower rate, and apply the savings towards other 
command needs. In its capacity, DCAA is tasked to protect the public interest, including 
that of both the taxpayer and the warfighter. 
According to the DCAA website, DCAA consists of over 300 field offices and 
4,000 employees. Its auditors are tasked with the examination and review of contractor 
accounts, records, and business systems to ensure the contractor’s business practices and 
procedures are in accordance with the FAR, the DFARS, and other applicable 
government regulations and laws, as required. All DCAA audits and auditors are required 
to adhere to a set of professional standards contained in the Generally Accepted 
Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS), or “Yellowbook.” GAGAS provides the 
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government’s adaptation of Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, or the quality 
control framework for conducting audits with competence, integrity, objectivity, and 
independence (GAO, 2011). 
DCAA has no direct contracting authority, but provides recommendations and 
advice to government officials who are responsible for acquisition and government 
contract administration, such as contracting officers (CO), administrating contracting 
officers (ACO), and procuring contracting officers (PCO). DCAA provides a number of 
deliverables to its stakeholders, including rate request memorandums, audit reports, 
voucher (billing) reviews and negotiation support. As the main focus of DCAA remains 
audit services, the major audits offered by DCAA include: 
 Incurred Cost 
 Labor Floor Checks (MAAR 6) 
 Purchase Existence & Consumption (MAAR 13) 
 Billing Systems 
 Paid Voucher/Direct Billing Systems 
 Provisional Billing Rates 
 Pre/Post Award Account Systems 
 Proposals 
 CAS Compliance 
 
2. What is an “Audit”? 
The commonly used term “Auditing” actually refers to “Audit, Attestation and 
Assurance” services. These services are provided by professional certified public 
accountants and auditors to provide end-users/investors with an elevated degree of 
assurance as to whether the subject of the audit is meeting or has the ability to meet its 
business objectives (Louwers, 2007). In the case of the acquisition community, this could 
range from expressing an opinion on reasonableness of a contractor’s proposal to 
providing an opinion on the effectiveness of a contractor’s accounting system. 
Government “audits” must be conducted in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS); a set of standards produced by the GAO 
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establishing the quality standards that must be followed when conducting an audit. 
Adherence to these standards is the basis for an audit opinion’s elevated assurance on the 
subject matter. In addition to general standards applying to all activities, GAGAS provide 
instruction covering three areas of auditing, attestation and assurance services: Financial 
Audits, Attestation Engagements, and Performance Audits. 
Financial Audits specifically refer to an independent auditor expressing an 
objective opinion on an organization’s financial statements; or management’s assertion of 
the organization’s financial position. The opinion expressed comes in the form of an audit 
report, expressing an opinion over whether an entity’s balance sheet, income statement 
and statement of cash flow are in accordance with U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Financial audits are generally the most intensive and detailed form of 
audit, offering the highest degree of assurance, and are conducted in accordance with 
U.S. Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and the American Institute of 
CPA’s (AICPA) Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS), both of which are incorporated 
and expanded upon in the GAGAS (GAO, 2011). Generally, DCAA does not perform 
financial audits.  
Attestation is a type of audit and consists of a practitioner being engaged to issue 
a report on specific subject matter, or assertions on the subject matter, that is the 
responsibility of a third party (Louwers, 2007). These engagements often focus on 
compliance with laws/regulations/contracts, prospective information, performance, 
internal control and accounting systems. Attestation engagements must be conducted in 
accordance with the AICPA’s Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements 
(SSAE), which are incorporated into, and expanded upon within, chapter 5 of the 







Type of Engagement Assurance Description 
Examination Positive 
Management’s assertions appear in 
accordance with the applicable 
criteria.  
Review Negative 
Did not observe anything suggesting 
management’s assertions are not in 





Details the results of the procedures 
performed. 
Table 1.   Types of Audits 
 Examinations – Offer positive assurance, meaning the auditor believes 
management’s assertions are in accordance with the applicable criteria. 
Similar to financial audits, examinations require significant procedures to 
be performed, and result in a high level of assurance. The majority of 
audits conducted by DCAA are examinations.  
 Reviews – Offer negative assurance, meaning the auditor did not observe 
anything suggesting management’s assertions are not in accordance with 
the applicable criteria. This provides a moderate level of assurance, and 
requires a much lower scope of work than an examination. GAGAS 1.23 
bars reviews over information related to internal controls, or compliance 
with laws and regulations (GAO, 2011). 
 Agreed-upon Procedures – Offer no opinion, however detail the 
procedures agreed to by the requestor and auditor, and findings and 
observations of the auditor resulting from the procedures. 
Performance Audit services expand Auditing and Attestation to include 
nonfinancial information and non-economic subjects where decision-makers must rely on 
the subject matter, such as specific requirements, measures or business practices. DCAA 
performs some operational audits that fall under this area. The requirements for 
performance audits are addressed in chapter six of the Government Auditing Standards 
(GAO, 2011).  
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While DCAA offers a variety of services and opinions, the detection of fraud and 
similar unlawful activities is not the primary purpose of an audit. The auditor must still 
plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance over the contractor’s 
submission and determine the supporting documentation is free from material 
misstatements, whether caused by error or fraud. 
The type of audit requested by the contracting officer will directly impact both the 
amount of time/scope of work to be undertaken by DCAA, as well as the degree of 
assurance provided in the final audit report.  
3. Programmed Focus 
DCAA’s audit effort can be classified as “demand” work and “programmed” 
work. Demand work includes all requests from contracting officers and DCMA that are 
received throughout the year. Programmed work includes annual known work that 
DCAA is responsible to perform, such as annual incurred cost audits, and mandatory 
annual audit requirements (MAAR) 6 (Labor floor checks) and 13 (material existence and 
consumption).  
Due to manpower limitations, DCAA must make choices each year on what work 
is included in the program plan, and what work cannot be accommodated. In determining 
the programmed work to be undertaken, DCAA employs a “risk-based” planning process 
to focus the Agency’s priorities on the highest payback opportunities for the DOD, the 
warfighter, and the taxpayer (Fitzgerald, 2013). “High risk,” according to DCAA, 
generally involves high-dollar proposals, historically high rates of questioned costs, or 
circumstances where the contractor’s internal controls are historically weak to almost 
nonexistent. The goal is to efficiently apply agency resources in such a way as to achieve 
the greatest return to the DOD and taxpayer (DCAA, 2012). 
A few of DCAA’s highest priority assignments include: 
1. Audits of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO): By definition, OCO 
is funding set aside to provide for the urgent continuous support of our 
warfighters fighting on the ground. In both the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, 
much of the contract work is often farmed out to foreign companies. 
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Therefore, the typical internal control structure seen in America’s defense 
contractors do not necessarily apply to their foreign partners. Although 
these contractors are obligated to adhere to the same laws and regulations 
as with companies in the U.S., they often lack the understanding and 
familiarity with the guidelines. Foreign companies generally adhere to 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), if any, rather than 
U.S. GAAP (Ernst & Young, 2008). Due to the differences between these 
entities’ methods of doing business, it is DCAA’s priority to increase 
oversight over these companies. In 2012, DCAA audited roughly $6.4 
billion in OCO contracts and recommended a reduction in costs of about 
$1.1 billon (DCAA, 2012). 
2. Perhaps no other audit area attracts more attention from the acquisition 
community than Forward Pricing Audits. These audits provide assurance 
on the data used for negotiating a fair and reasonable contract price. In 
broad terms, the forward pricing audits are completed before the contract 
is awarded. Their purpose is to evaluate contractor cost estimates for 
goods or services being proposed for a future product. In 2012, DCAA 
performed over 1,800 forward pricing audits and identified $9.9 billion in 
cost savings (DCAA, 2012). 
3. Following the forward pricing audits in visibility are the incurred cost 
audits. These engagements provide assurance as to the accuracy of the 
contractor’s historical claimed costs. DCAA examines historical claimed 
costs to determine whether the costs are allowable, allocable, and 
reasonable as outlined in FAR part 31. Incurred cost audits assist the 
contracting officer in the recovery of questionable costs before the 
contract is closed out. Unfortunately, the Contract Disputes Act defines 
the statute of limitations for government claims against contractors at six 
years (41 U.S. Code Chapter 71). This means that once incurred cost 
proposals are submitted to DCAA and have not been audited within six 
years, the government loses its prerogative to review the costs and seek 
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reimbursement for questionable items. Over the past couple of years, 
DCAA has received some negative publicity with respect to the backlog of 
incurred cost audits that have not been completed. In order to mitigate this 
serious situation, DCAA has developed a detailed action plan beginning in 
FY2012, however the pressure of the statute of limitations and the lack of 
available resources has led to an increasing number of incurred cost 
proposals going unaudited (DCAA, 2012). 
4. Two other areas audited by DCAA are Equitable Adjustments and 
Termination Claim Audits: These two types of audits represent more of a 
challenge to the auditor because of their complexity and relatively high 
risk. In certain cases, contracts may be adjusted or terminated before their 
completion. Additionally, depending on contract complexity, litigation 
before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals of the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims may also occur. In 2012, DCAA examined approximately 
$6.4 billion under these two types of audits, and identified $405 million in 
exceptions (DCAA, 2012). 
5. The use of DCAA Financial Liaison Advisors (FLA): FLAs are co-located 
at major buying commands within the DOD. The FLA provides assistance 
to the contracting officer when complex audit reports must be interpreted 
and used in the negotiation of a fair and reasonable contract price (DCAA, 
2012). 
6. Lastly, DCAA is also involved in investigative support. During the course 
of audit fieldwork, there are cases when indicators of fraud, waste, and 
abuse are observed. When such situations become evident, DCAA alerts 
the appropriate authorities responsible for conducting fraud investigations. 
The DoDIG as well as the U.S Department of Justice are two examples of 
offices that could potentially become involved in a case (DCAA, 2012). 
Mr. Patrick Fitzgerald, Director, DCAA (DCAA, 2012) highlights several 
important acquisition programs where DCAA had a direct impact. Some examples of 
DCAA’s assistance to program/buying offices include: 
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 In performing a thorough examination on the Apache AH-64 attack 
helicopter, DCAA identified over $65 million in potential cost savings. 
 DCAA supported the modernization of a critical asset: the Bradley 
Fighting Vehicle. In their support of this asset, DCAA audited a $702 
million proposal and the audit team identified over $22 million in cost 
exceptions, primarily related to vendors and subcontractors. 
 DCAA evaluated $1.1 billion for the Navy to secure over 200 F414 
engines for the F-18 Super Hornet fighter aircraft. The audit team’s work 
resulted in a fair and reasonable price and saved the government 
approximately $325,000 per engine or $65 million on the total contract 
acquisition. 
 Identified nearly $70 million in current and future savings for 1,500 new 
Embedded GPS Inertial navigational Systems for the USAF. 
 Secured $237 million in net savings by evaluating $4 billion in C-130J 
aircraft proposals. 
 Supported over $45 million in cash repayments to the government for the 
F-22 program. 
 Conduct on-site audit oversight activities for the $2 billion Kuwait Base 
Operations. 
4. Strategic Plan 
Dr. Cary Simon, of the Naval Postgraduate School, defines a strategic issue as a 
fundamental policy question or critical challenge affecting an organization’s mandates, 
mission and values, to list a few (Simon, 2012). To accomplish its strategic goals, DCAA 
has outlined five areas that the agency wants to concentrate on over the next five-year 
time frame (DCAA, 2011): 
 Goal 1: A “One Agency” concept with a culture of teamwork, excellence, 
accountability, mutual respect, integrity, and trust 
 Goal 2: High-quality audits and other financial advisory services 
 Goal 3: Highly skilled and motivated professionals dedicated to excellence 
in accomplishing its mission. That mission is to have dedicated 
professionals working together to deliver top-quality audit services to 
support the Department and the warfighter, and to protect the taxpayer’s 
interest. 
 Goal 4: Effective working relationships with DCAA’s external 
stakeholders 
 Goal 5: The workforce has the right space, the right equipment, and the 
right technology at the right time to successfully deliver on the mission. 
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According to DCAA’s website, DCAA’s services are used by all major 
commands throughout the DOD, working together to serve the warfighter and taxpayer is 
a principal goal. Contract procurement, management, and auditing activities directly 
affected 73.4% of the 2012 Defense budget. In FY 2011, DCAA was able to provide a 
return on investment of $5.80 for each dollar invested in FY 2011. This translated to 
saving the taxpayer and warfighter $3.5 Billion in FY 2011. The savings enjoyed by the 
DOD is applied to additional purchases, supplying the warfighter (Fitzgerald, 2012). 
In order to provide better auditing services to the acquisition community, and 
increase the effective working relationships with DCAA’s external stakeholders (goal 
#4), it is imperative that DCAA becomes much more proactive in communicating the 
services that are available to contracting officers, becoming more transparent, and adding 
value to the contracting community.  
In his Director’s Overview (DCAA, 2012), Mr. Fitzgerald explained that DCAA 
exists “to serve the warfighter and protect the taxpayer interests.” As a result of DCAA’s 
efforts, FY 2012 resulted in over $4.2 billion in net savings to the government. DCAA 
identified these savings after examination of $154 billion in contracting dollars and 
issuing over 6,700 audit reports.  
It should be emphasized that DCAA is not just a commodity required by the FAR. 
DCAA plays a critical role in saving tax payer dollars, and assisting program offices with 
increasing the return on their investments. The success of the Agency is based on what 
happens after the audit has been completed, and its impact on the acquisition process. As 
expressed by Mr. Fitzgerald this requires the Agency “to perform the right audits, in the 
right way, with the right placement of resources devoted to the highest value work.” 
In order to build on the Agency’s commitment to providing the best value for the 
DOD, Mr. Fitzgerald initiated several key strategies in 2012 that are also applicable in 
2013 and beyond. The following will briefly touch on several areas of major importance 
to Mr. Fitzgerald. Those areas include: 
 Allocating audit resources based on risk vs. audit quotes,  
 Conducting rigorous evaluations of contractor data, 
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 Balancing quality and schedule with timeliness, 
 Restructuring audit management of large contractors to drive quality 
through efficient organization 
 Meeting with buying command and industry partners to better understand 
acquisition community challenges 
 Supporting contracting officers at the negotiation table, 
 Implementing the Strategic Plan to maintain audit quality and a positive 
work environment. 
Allocating limited resources to the right audits requires a certain amount of risk 
management. In other words, in providing the most value in the acquisition process, using 
a risk-based approach assists in identifying areas in which greater audit concentration is 
required and where it is not. For example, depending on the dollar threshold, contract 
type (cost reimbursable vs. fixed priced), and the specific cost element (labor, material, or 
subcontracts) can usually clue the auditor to the type of risk involved. Another important 
consideration is the contractor’s prior history of doing business with the government. 
Conducting a rigorous evaluation of the contractor’s data allows the DCAA 
auditor to get a much better understanding of the contractor’s business environment, and 
increases the level of assurance offered by the auditor’s opinion.  
When performing an audit, there are two significant components working in 
unison: quality and timeliness. Increasing the quality of the audit report requires strict 
adherence to GAGAS as well as increasing the level of documentation effort and testing. 
Conversely, an increase in quality often has an inverse effect on timeliness due to the 
increased level of effort. Timeliness is defined by the auditor and customer in 
determining the desired dates for audit completion, but more importantly ensuring those 
dates are realistic and achieving them.  
DCAA has made an aggressive effort to reach out to the acquisition community to 
better understand their challenges and concerns. During 2012, DCAA executives made 
regular visits with industry officials, buying commands, and attended conferences, to 
discuss issues related to all parties’ expectations and perspectives. This practice will be 
implemented in 2013 and beyond. 
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5. Recent Criticisms 
As noted in Defense News (Chacko, 2012), “the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
conducted 7,390 audits in 2011.” The 7,390 is less than a third (26,623 audits) performed 
six years ago. Ms. Chacko goes on to mention that audits of the Pentagon’s contractor 
costs “have slowed to a trickle in recent years, prompting critics to charge that billions of 
dollars in questionable costs are likely being paid but not flagged by auditors.” She 
believes the dramatic slowdown occurred even as the agency has ramped up hiring in the 
same period by about 20 percent. 
According to her, “one result of the slowdown: a daunting $573 billion backlog of 
contracts stretching back six years that have already been paid but still await auditing. Six 
years ago, the backlog figure was $110 billion, less than one-fifth of the current size.” 
In his vigorous defense of the agency, Mr. Fitzgerald, wrote a letter to the editor 
(Federal Times, 2012). In his reply, Mr. Fitzgerald mentioned that the editorial failed to 
discuss a few very key points that provide a more accurate picture in terms of the 
agency’s effectiveness and productivity.  
The two keys points quoted from Mr. Fitzgerald were:  
1) “you imply that our performance standard should be the number of audits 
DCAA was completing at the time it was criticized by the Government 
Accountability Office. This just isn’t where our agency needs to be.”  
2) “DCAA’s performance of more audits does not automatically result in more 
savings. In reality, the amount of net savings is one of the most tangible benefits 
of our audit work.” 
The driving point to Mr. Fitzgerald’s argument is that “choosing the right audits 
and doing them comprehensively is more effective and beneficial than simply completing 
more audits. For example, in fiscal 2003, we examined $265 billion, questioned $8 
billion (3 percent) of costs and issued over 29,000 audit reports. In fiscal 2011, we 
examined $128 billion, questioned $11.9 billion (9 percent) of costs and issued about 
7,000 reports. Although we issued about 75 percent fewer audit reports and examined 
fewer dollars, we questioned more costs on a percentage basis.” Simply put, auditing 
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higher risk proposals where the estimated costs are in the hundreds of millions of dollars 
will result in an increase in net savings. 
At some point, DCAA’s leadership had to make some difficult decisions. By 
using a risk-based approach, it allows for the best use of DCAA’s resources on audits 
with the highest return for its efforts. Mr. Fitzgerald made the decision to focus on higher 
payback audits. While he believes this was the right decision, it resulted in a large 
backlog of incurred-cost audits.  
It is also important to stress here that over the past several years, the agency has 
been faced with contractor’s submission packages that were inadequate at best. For 
example, the contractor is required to submit their forward pricing proposals using the 
guidelines established in FAR 15 and specifically in, Table 15-2 (Appendix A). It’s not 
uncommon that contractors will exclude a properly detailed bill of material (BOM) in 
their submission. Since the BOM is a required document in the proposal, DCAA has no 
choice but to return the proposal back to the contractor. This ultimately creates a major 
delay in performing the audit and creates havoc in the contracting officer’s scheduling for 
potential negotiations.  
In March 2010, Loeb (Loeb, 2010) wrote an article entitled “GAO vs. DCAA - 
And the Winner Is? Contractor!” In May 2012 (Loeb, 2012), he wrote another article 
entitled “DCAA – Is Anyone Home?”  
The March 2010 article discusses the major findings the GAO found during its 
investigation into DCAA’s management of “inappropriately removing audit findings 
from audit reports.” According to the article, the root causes of the DCAA issues during 
this time were: 
 inadequate working paper documentation,  
 insufficient transaction testing,  
 independence, and  
 management abuse. 
Only the first two issues will be mentioned here. In the former case, it was 
mentioned that when the auditor was faced with a decrease in budget (the amount of time 
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to complete an audit) the first area impacted was the amount of documentation made in 
the work paper package. In the latter case, the GAO reported that DCAA was not 
properly performing transaction testing even though the DOD IG’s office gave DCAA a 
clean opinion. 
The initial differences GAO had with DCAA now became a tug of war between 
the GAO and the DoDIG’s office. If in the past DCAA performed its audits to the 
specifications of the DoDIG and passed, then why now did the GAO have issues with the 
way DCAA was performing its audits? Apparently, the GAO may have more stringent 
interpretation of the auditing standards than the DoDIG and DCAA. As it turns out, the 
difference between the GAO and the DoDIG’s opinions may focus on the interruption of 
the GAGAS. See below. 
In the May 2012 article Mr. Loeb discusses the decline in DCAA audits even 
though the agency continues to hire more auditors. It is similar in nature to the article 
written by Ms. Chacko, however, he does go into detail about GAGAS. As Mr. Loeb 
pointed out with respect to audit documentation and internal reviews of working papers, 
DCAA may be “going overboard on complying with GAGAS.” If DCAA is going to 
perform audits that add value, are timely, and provide the contracting officers with 
information that is relevant to their work, then the GAO, DoDIG, and DCAA must work 
together to resolve the GAGAS compliance issues. 
6. Office of Personnel Management Surveys 
As noted in Mr. Fitzgerald’s Overview (DCAA, 2012), the agency in 2012 
showed significant improvement in employee satisfaction based on the annual survey 
conducted by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). This survey provided a 
snapshot of employees’ perceptions of whether or not success was a characteristic of their 
organization. Of the 84 total questions, DCAA employees gave higher ratings (85 
percent) for 71 of the total questions. This was better than the rating provided in 2011. 
Mr. Fitzgerald was particularly pleased with the answers to the following categories: 
 Leadership 
 Supervision / Team Leader 
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 Work Experience 
It is important to realize that in past surveys, DCAA was criticized in the areas 
mentioned above. Mr. Fitzgerald stated that these areas are essential for the overall 
workforce satisfaction and critical to the Agency’s overall success in the future. 
7. Command Feedback Initiatives/DCAA’s Challenges in Supporting 
Customers 
In order to improve communication, quality, and the working relationship 
between DCAA and the buying commands, DCAA initiated the Command Feedback 
Initiatives (CFI). Specifically, the CFI is a survey sent out to the buying commands that 
DCAA provides its services to. In order to improve its services, it is essential to hear 
directly from DCAA’s customers the areas they feel DCAA is doing very well in and at 
the same time, areas where DCAA needs to improve. The CFI is a series of probing 
questions asking the commands if DCAA’s products such as its audit report provided the 
following: 
 received in a timely manner 
 was the report useful 
 did it provide enough detail  
 was it responsive to the request 
 was there adequate communication between the auditor and requester 
 if additional services were provided by DCAA, was the requestor satisfied 
 was the customer satisfied overall with DCAA’s quality of work 
 what additional services can DCAA provide to the command 
We obtained and reviewed copies of DCAA CFIs covering a period from 01 
October 2011 to 31 March 2012 (See Appendix B). The first set covers Calendar Years 
(CY) 2008 through 2011 and was divided in six-month increments (01 January 2008 to 
30 June 2008 and 01 July 2008 to 31 December 2008). During this timeframe, the 
following five-digit assignment codes were included in the universe: 
17100 = Termination audits (Fixed and Cost Type) 
17200 = Claim Audits 
1774X = Pre-Award 
19 
21000 = Price Proposals 
22000 = Integrated Product Team (IPTs) are no longer performed by DCAA 
23000 = Forward Pricing Rate Proposals 
270X0 = Cost Element or Cost Realism audits 
28000 = Application of Agreed Upon Procedures. 
For assignment numbers 21000 and 270X0, 100 percent of the high risk proposals 
were selected for review. Additionally, 10 assignments covering the same assignment 
codes were selected for non-high risk proposals and 15 assignments were selected for 
assignment code numbers 17100, 17200, 1774X, 22000, 23000, and 28000. Table 2 
provides a summary of the sample strata. 
 
Ass ignment Number of
# Ass ignment Type Universe Ass ignments  Selected
1 High Risk Proposals  - Cost Type 12 12
2 High Risk Proposals  - Fixed Price 64 64
3 21000 Non High Risk 281 10
4 27000 Non High Risk 180 10
5 27010 Non High Risk 31 3
6 23000 211 15
7 28000 10 2
8 17740 139 15
9 17741 255 15
10 17100 62 9
11 17200 26 4
Total 1,271            159
 
Table 2.   DCAA Assignments Selected for Review 
Appendix B summarizes the nine survey questions in which the various DCAA 
customers were requested to answer:  
Question 1, Timely receipt of audit report: The high point was an average of 97% 
in CY 2008. The low point was an average of 57% in CY 2011. The decline in audit 
report timeliness aligns exactly with the 2009 GAO report on DCAA (GAO, 2009).  
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Question 2, Usefulness of the audit report: DCAA scored an average of 97% for 
CYs 2008 to 2011. We noted, however, that “usefulness” was not defined, and may be 
limited to the table of questioned rates provided in the final audit report. 
Question 3, Audit report sufficiently detailed: DCAA scored an average of 97% 
for CYs 2008 to 2011. We noted here that “sufficiently detailed” from the requestor’s 
perspective and “sufficiently detailed” from the GAGAS perspective are not congruent. 
Question 4, Audit report responsive to each item in the request: DCAA scored an 
average of 97% for CYs 2008 to 2011.  
Question 5, Customer suggestions for improving report’s usefulness and/or 
presentation: DCAA scored an average of 11% for CYs 2008 to 2011. The low response 
rate suggests that DCAA’s customers did not have suggestions. 
Question 6, Communication between Field Audit Office (FAO) and customer 
sufficient: DCAA scored an average of 94% for CYs 2008 to 2011. Based on this 
statistic, DCAA is doing very well in communicating with its customers. As discussed in 
DCAA’s Contract Audit Manuel (CAM) (Chapter 1–400), as an “audit and financial 
advisor to procurement and contract administration activities, auditors must understand 
and support the services needs of these organizations.” The agency is committed to 
“providing timely and responsive services and will maintain communications and liaison 
services sufficient to continuously assess if customer needs are being met.” 
Question 7 is a two-prong approach. Part A asks if the customer requested 
additional assistance and Part B asks if so, the customer was satisfied. 
Question 7a, customer requested additional assistance after issuance of report 
(e.g., attendance at negotiations): DCAA scored an average of 22% for CYs 2008 to 
2011. In 22% of the time, additional assistance was requested and conversely, in 78% of 
the time, assistance was not requested. The 78% may indicate the customer not inviting 
the DCAA auditor(s) to attend negotiations. As stated in CAM, Chapter 15–402 (Auditor 
Attendance at a Negotiation Conference), “in routine audits, auditor availability for 
negotiations will be presumed.” The primary advantage for the auditor to attend 
negotiations especially if the acquisition is complex and high dollar; is to assist the 
contracting officer in negotiating a fair and reasonable price. Since the auditor performed 
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the audit and has detail information with respect to the proposed cost elements, he or she 
is in a very desirable position to explain the contractor’s methodology for proposing the 
costs. 
Question 7b, If so, was the customer satisfied with the additional services? 
DCAA scored an average of 89% for CYs 2008 to 2011. Although this score is relatively 
high, the customer must do a better job in requesting DCAA assistance at negotiations.  
Question 8, Was the customer satisfied with the overall quality of work? DCAA 
scored an average of 98% for CYs 2008 to 2011.  
Question 9, Additional services DCAA can provide? DCAA scored an average of 
10% for CYs 2008 to 2011. This was also a low response rate. In further researching this 
question, as a follow up to the first half of CY 2011 CFI results, some of the customers 
had the following comments: 
 Be more proactive in assist audit follow up. DCAA needs to realize that 
their definition of impartiality (independence) is rendering them 
independently ineffective. DCAA seeks perfection and has no sense of 
urgency (BAE Rockville Resident Office (RO), Audit Report No. 6281-
2011U21000001, dated 20 January 2011). 
 There is a need for forward pricing rate agreements covering both direct 
and indirect rates and cost of money factors (St. Louis Branch Office, 
Audit Report No. 3201-2011H27000001, dated 6 May 2011). 
 Better teamwork and communication efforts in cases of contractor delays 
(General Dynamics land Systems Resident Office, Audit Report No. 
2271–2010P27000004, dated 9 February 2011). 
 Getting involved with DCAA at the beginning of the process (Maricopa 
Branch Office (BO), Audit Report No. 4821-2010R21000030, dated 8 
February 2011). 
 Lower DCAA staff movement (South Bay Branch Office, Audit Report 
No. 4421-2010E2700000S1, dated 29 October 2010). 
 
The areas in need of improvement related to Fieldwork included: 
 Customers not being invited to the exit conference. The results showed that 
69% of the customers were not invited to the exit conference. 
 Audit report due dates were only met 50% of the time, even with multiple 
requested extensions. 
 For walkthroughs, only 56% of the customers were invited. 
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 For audit report due date agreement, only 77% of the customers were 
satisfied. 
 For timely audit request acknowledgment, 81% of the customers were 
satisfied. 
 
On a scale of five (five is highest), the two areas where DCAA scored highest were in: 
 Proposal walkthrough, a score of 3.9 out of 5.0 was achieved. 
 The benefit of attending the exit conference, a score of 3.3 out of 5.0 was 
achieved. 
 
The survey also provided results for Audit Report Questions. The area identified as 
needing improvement was audit report responsiveness. Issues identified were: 
 Timeliness issues. 
 The lack of responsiveness “seriously hindered” the customer’s ability to 
negotiate in a timely manner. 
 The audit report was no longer valid since it was received too late in the 
acquisition process, thus could not be used to prepare for negotiations. 
 
The areas in need of improvement related to Post-Report Questions included: 
 The customer did not invite the auditor to negotiations 75% of the time. 
 When the auditor was invited to negotiations, it was only 57% of the time. 
 
The results by audit type showed that for assignment number 23000 (FPRP), the 
following issues need to be addressed: 
 
 Timely acknowledgements 
 Walkthroughs 
 Notification of deficiencies 
 Due date coordination 
 Meeting the agreed to due dates 
 Inviting the requestor to the exit conferences 
 Auditors being invited to negotiations 
 Overall satisfaction 
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The results by command showed the following: 
 The highest ratings went to the Army Contracting Command (ACC)-Redstone 
and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). 
 The lowest rating went to DCMA since one-half of their assignments were 
23000s. 
 
For 23000 assignments, timeliness and communication are again the two most 
important ingredients.  
The table included in Appendix B covers CYs 2008 to 2011 and provides some 
interesting statistics especially for questions 1 (timeliness), 2 (usefulness of the audit 
report), 3 (audit report sufficient in detail), 4 (audit report responsiveness to the items 
requested), 6 (the effectiveness of communication), 7a (additional audit assistance after 
audit report issuance), 7b (if yes to 7a, customer satisfaction), 8 (customer overall quality 
satisfaction), and 9 (additional DCAA services). 
8. Summary 
As mentioned above and stressed in Mr. Fitzgerald’s strategic plan, 
communication must be done throughout the entire audit process as well as after the audit 
report has been issued. In the latter case, proactive communication with the requestor is 
extremely important. If the requestor is confused about an issue addressed in the audit 
report, the auditor can easily remedy the situation 
Overall, the following areas need improvement if DCAA is going to be relevant 
and not a commodity: 
o Need improvement coordination of a mutually agreeable report due date with the 
requestor and meeting that date. This is where communication is the key 
component. The requestor and the auditor must communicate so that a reasonable 
due date is attainable. Promising a due date that is unrealistic could create issues 
later in the audit performance of a particular assignment. 
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B. DEFENSE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
1. DCMA Responsibilities and Primary Function 
Whereas the DCAA is responsible for providing audit and financial support to the 
commands, the DCMA like DCAA, is an independent agency responsible for providing a 
wide range of acquisition management services for commands located both domestic and 
abroad. Specifically, DCMA’s authority spans to more than 324,000 prime contracts 
being performed at more than 18,500 contractor locations. According to DCMA’s 
website, the agency manages contracts in excess of $1.963 billion, and manages more 
than one million financial transactions annually to authorize disbursement of 
approximately $155 billion. 
DCMA is the DOD component that works directly with contractors to ensure that 
contracted DOD supplies and services are delivered on time, on cost, and meet all 
specified performance requirements. DCMA staff serve as “information brokers,” or on-
site representatives for the DOD buying commands throughout the acquisition life cycle. 
As published on DCMA’s public website, its services consist of two phases: 
 
Before contract award, DCMA provides advice and information to help construct 
effective solicitations, identify potential risks, select the most capable contractors, 
and write contracts that meet the needs of our customers in DOD, Federal and 
allied government agencies.  
 
After contract award, DCMA monitors contractors’ performance and 
management systems to ensure that cost, product performance, and delivery 
schedules are in compliance with the terms and conditions of the contracts. 
Although DCMA provides expertise in areas such as quality assurance, cost, 
schedule, and supply chain endeavors, the agency is concerned with losing their skill set 




developing new capabilities within their core technical expertise. To accomplish this, 
DCMA is emphasizing the areas of quality assurance and supply chain management. For 
example,  
o In quality assurance; ensuring delivery of quality products and services to 
the warfighter and in  
o Supply chain management, gaining an understanding of the risks and 
delivering that information to their customers so they can make smart 
decisions. 
2. DCMA Challenges 
As with any organization, success depends on strategic objectives/challenges 
facing it. According to the DCMA website, after a comprehensive evaluation of their 
current environment and an analysis of future trends, their Strategic Plan identifies and 
addresses four important challenges faced by the organization. 
 Loss of people: DCMA has lost more than 50 percent of its people since 1990, 
yet workload has risen by more than 25 percent. Their recruitment efforts 
have not kept pace with their hiring needs. 
 Erosion of skills: Between workforce reduction and lack of investment in 
maintaining their technical edge such as training, enhancing skills and 
implementing new process controls, they have fallen behind the curve in their 
core contract administration competencies.  
 Efficient use of agency resources: There is an obligation to increase efficiency 
in everything they do. Therefore, DCMA must find ways to better align their 
agency organizations and systems to more effectively deliver high value 
services to their customers.  
 Increased customer demand for specialized skills: DCMA is being asked to 
expand their analytical capabilities in areas such as Pricing, Earned Value 
Management (EVM), and Supply Chain Management (SCM). In addition, 
DCMA has assumed an increased role in support of military operations in-
theater. The agency is not currently equipped with the skills or resources to 
meet these increased demands. 
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3. DCMA’s Strategic Plan 
DCMA’s Strategic Plan incorporates several key perspectives that will be briefly 
discussed in this section. These perspectives incorporate three components: 1) Agency 
end goals, 2) Agency Strategic Priority, and 3) Agency Initiatives consisting of many 
factors. Here are a few of them. 
I) Acquisition Customers 
a. Agency’s End Goal: DCMA’s end goal is to ensure their acquisition 
customers receive excellent contract services and relevant information to 
make sound business decisions. 
b. Agency’s Strategic Priority: deliver quality information to the buying 
activities through vigorous financial, industrial and supply chain analysis. 
c. Agency’s Initiatives:  
i. Improve DCMA’s performance as the DOD’s Executive Agent for 
Earned Value Management Systems. 
ii. Continue to build Manufacturing and Supply Chain Management 
core competency. 
iii. Develop a system allowing for timely, accurate, and predictive 
business information of contractor capabilities across all DCMA 
contracts and customers. 
iv. Develop a better way of measuring customer satisfaction. 
v. Execute their expanded mission for Contingency Contract 
Administration Services (CCAS) more effectively and efficiently. 
II) Policies and Processes 
a. Agency End Goal: effective policies and procedures ensuring delivery of 
consistent and cost effective contract administration services. 
b. Agency Strategic Priority: promulgate policy and process guidance. 
c. Agency Initiatives: 
i. Develop a plan to effectively rebuild and execute quality assurance 
capabilities through improved policies, processes, and tools. 
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ii. Develop a plan to effectively execute engineering analysis 
capabilities through improved policy, processes and tools. 
iii. In combination with buying commands and DCAA, develop a 
concept for the agency’s future role in contract pricing that 
eliminates duplicate efforts. 
iv. Establish agency Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Program Office to 
enhance agency operational performance and ensure common 
approach on LSS projects. 
III) Human Capital 
a. Agency End Goal: Develop a highly skilled workforce capable of 
executing current and future missions. 
b. Agency Strategic Priority: 
i. Grow and retool the workforce through a strong intern program, 
increasing external recruitment, and relying on internal 
development. 
ii. Enhance leadership skills across the agency and ensure the 
workforce at all levels, has access to and fully understands 
available opportunities to develop and improve these skills. 
c. Agency Initiatives 
i. Attract, recruit, develop, and retain a high-performing and diverse 
workforce. 
ii. Deliver effective technical training and foster a culture of 
mentorship across the workforce. 
iii. Revitalize DCMA’s leadership development for both civilian and 
military personnel. 
IV) Management 
a. Agency End Goal: an organization with roles, responsibilities, and 
management controls that are well defined and fully aligned to effectively 
and efficiently manage public resources. 
b. Agency Strategic Priority: Ensure the efficient use of agency resources. 
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c. Agency Initiatives: 
i. Develop and execute short and long-range resource planning and 
analysis of resources needed to support the workload. 
ii. Promulgate policy to enhance mission performance. 
iii. Continue to improve management controls on financial 
management systems, audit readiness, and improve access to 
timely financial management information. 
4. DCMA’s Customers 
DCMA is under DOD’s Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (AT&L). Other reporting entities include: 1) the Missile 
Defense Agency, 2) Defense Logistics Agency and 3) the Defense Acquisition 
University.  
The USD (AT&L) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to both the Secretary 
of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters concerning acquisition, 
technology and logistics. 
5. Recent Criticisms 
A central theme in this paper has focused on the independent responsibilities of 
both DCAA and DCMA. As previously noted, these agencies are tasked with different 
missions. However, in recent years the higher-ups in the DOD have attempted to shift 
some of the audit duties from DCAA to DCMA. This topic was part of a DoDIG report 
issued on 13 November 2012 (DoDIG, 2012). 
In their report, (DoDIG, 2012), the DoDIG evaluated the actions taken by DOD 
officials to align DCAA and the DCMA functions by increasing the dollar thresholds a 
contractor’s proposal must meet before the contracting officer can request a DCAA audit. 
Currently and based on DFARS’ (PGI 215.404-2c), the minimum threshold for a DCAA 
audit is: 
o Fixed-price proposals exceeding $10 million; 
o Cost-type proposals exceeding $100 million. 
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If the dollar values are below the amounts shown above, then DCMA is to 
perform the audit. This shift in DCMA performing the work of DCAA has created a 
major concern addressed in the report. 
Specifically, in “Finding B” of this report, the DoDIG documented that DCMA’s 
cost analysis “does not demonstrate that the DCMA cost analysts performed work 
sufficient to determine a contractor’s proposed cost and fee.” As required by FAR 15–
404.1(a), this analysis refers directly to determining a fair and reasonable price of a 
contractor’s proposal. 
The DoDIG report also mentioned that the Office of Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP) had been working with DCMA to “create a world-class 
pricing organization and believed DCMA was in a position to adequately perform the 
additional contracting officer requests.” 
However, in the study, the IG evaluated the cost analysis performed by DCMA at 
three of its Contract Management Offices (CMO). The criteria used by the IG was 
DCMA’s Instruction Folder Number 22 (Pricing and Negotiations – Contract; this is 
DCMA’s policy on the procedures used to perform cost analysis) and the guidelines 
included in the FAR.  
Covering the period from 17 September 2010 through 31 March 2011, the three 
DCMA CMOs performed cost analysis on 13 contractor proposals submitted with cost or 
pricing data. Based on the IG’s checklist which is included in the DoDIG’s report but not 
in this paper, the IG determined that in 13 of 13 cases (100 percent), the DCMA cost 
analysis did not demonstrate compliance with FAR or DCMA’s own Instruction Folder 
22. The IG report further stated that the DCMA CMO: 
 Does not provide evidence that the work was performed 
 Does not demonstrate how the cost analyst applied the various cost analysis 
techniques as stated in FAR 15.404-1(c) (2). The goal here is to determine a 
fair and reasonable price. 
 Does not demonstrate the actions taken by the cost analyst properly 
determined if the contractor submitted current, accurate, and complete cost or 
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pricing data with its certified proposal in accordance with the Truth and 
Negotiations Act (TINA) 
 Does not demonstrate that the cost analyst determined if the contractor was in 
compliance with FAR Part 31 with regard to contracts, subcontracts, and 
modifications for negotiations. 
 Does not demonstrate that the cost analyst determined if the contractor was in 
compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) 
In the 13 cases reviewed by the DoDIG, seven of those cases found that when 
technical evaluations were performed alongside the cost analysis, the evaluators did not 
follow the guidance in FAR 15.404-1(e)(2), Technical Analysis (GAO, 2009). 
The report mentions that DCMA also performed their own review of 15 additional 
CMOs using the same checklists that the DoDIG used. DCMA had noted that their 
findings were consistent with the DoDIG. As a result, DCMA had initiated corrective 
action to update their Pricing and Negotiation Instruction, standardize the cost analysis 
and technical support case file, and improve training.  
6. Relationship with DCAA  
DCAA and DCMA are separate agencies with their own unique mission 
statements; however, both agencies also have 11 areas of functional overlap (Ramirez, 
2012). This overlap creates an environment of inefficient application of DOD resources. 
The functions of both DCAA and DCMA are referenced in FAR Part 42 and 
DFARS Part 242. As noted in Ramirez, confusion has grown about the both agencies’ 
role in performing these functions. Since the acquisition community is growing impatient 
with both agencies with respect to this confusion of overlap, there is also an increase in 
duplicate data requests to contractors. Essentially, since the administrative contracting 
officer (ACO) receives their “instructions” from the procuring contracting officer (PCO), 
requests for the same type of services may be forwarded to both agencies. 
The 11 areas of overlap mentioned above are summarized below: 
1. Purchasing System 
2. Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs) 
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3. Contracting Pricing 
4. Financial Analysis 
5. Material Management 
6. Insurance 
7. Pensions 
8. Cost Account evaluation 
9. Final Overhead Rates 
10. Form 1s * 
11. Earned Value Management. 
* DCAA auditors as stated in the DCAA Contract Audit Manual (CAM – Section 6–
900), are responsible for notifying the ACO when there is a suspension and/or 
disapproval of costs under cost reimbursement contracts. The mechanism for this 
notification is issuance of DCAA Form 1. 
 
As previously mentioned, the acquisition community was not the only audience 
confused about the agencies’ roles. The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and 
Afghanistan (Chacko, 2011) and the defense industry associations have also expressed 
their concerns. To further compound the problem, the taxpayer as well as the 
warfighter—the two most important stakeholders—would not be well served by the 
duplication of government effort. Other stakeholders include DCAA and DCMA as well 
as the entire DOD, the defense contractor industry and finally the DoDIG, GAO, and 
Congress. 
In Ramirez’s (2012) opinion, the primary cause of the overlap stems from 
DCAA’s emphasis on maintaining its independence as the DOD’s professional audit 
agency. Specifically, if the aforementioned stakeholders are going to depend on DCAA 
audits, then DCAA must be able to demonstrate that their audits are based on GAGAS. 
As mentioned above, one of the chief tenants of GAGAS is independence. In order for 
DCAA to accomplish its audit mission, the agency must operate without undue influence 
from other parties such as DCMA, the ACO/PCO, and the contractor. In the past, DCAA 
often participated in joint DCAA/DCMA meetings to discuss risk and audit priorities, 
changes in disclosure statements, and assessing the contractor’s incurred cost claim 
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submission. As a consequence of the GAO report (GAO, 2009) adversely affecting 
DCAA’s independence and performance, these coordination meetings no longer exist. 
Historically, the contractor would submit the rate proposal package for DCAA 
audit. Once the auditors performed the audit and issued their report to DCMA, the latter 
would also be involved in analyzing the rates and comparing the proposed to actuals and 
other historical data. Once DCMA completed their analysis, the two agencies would meet 
to discuss their results and the final product would now be presented to the contractor for 
negotiations. Once negotiations were concluded, the forward pricing rate agreement 
(FPRA) would be established for both the government and the contractor’s use on all 
forward pricing proposals. 
However, due to DCAA’s “independence,” FPRAs are handled independently of 
DCMA’s effort. In short, the audit of the contractor’s proposed direct labor rates as well 
as their indirect rates and cost of money factors are completed separately. If DCMA 
issues forward pricing rate recommendations (FPRR), DCAA cannot opine on them until 
their audit is completed and goes through the various management layers of approval 
before the report is finally issued. In the meantime, both the government and the 
contractor are losing valuable time. 
Compounding this very difficult situation is a GAO report (GAO, 2009) and the 
Carter Memorandum (Carter, 2010). The following, taken from the Ramirez’s (Ramirez, 
2012) paper offers some alternatives to alleviating the problems mentioned so far. 
As with any recommendation, there are pros and cons. One suggestion is for the 
senior leaders of both agencies to address the overlaps and direct cooperation between the 
two. The advantage of addressing these overlap concerns is to document their roles, 
minimize organizational impact, and increase timeliness/effectiveness. The disadvantage 
is the difficulty in forging a new workplace culture. Will the employees be able to 
incorporate new responsibilities and act as team players so that the mission is 
accomplished on time, with reduced extra work, and outstanding quality? 
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C. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND 
1.  Responsibilities and Primary Function 
SMC, located in El Segundo, CA, is part of the overall Air Force Space 
Command (AFSPC) headquartered at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. AFSPC 
provides military space and cyberspace capabilities with a global outreach to the joint 
warfighting team. 
According to SMC’s website, SMC has the unique responsibility of developing, 
acquiring, fielding, and sustaining the world’s best space and missile systems for the 
warfighter and our nation. Air Force, AFSPC, and SMC’s mission is to deliver space and 
missile capabilities to America and its allies. Their vision is to be America’s space leader. 
The following provides a brief background of the eleven directorates making up 
SMC: 
1. Global Positioning System (GPS) Directorate: is responsible for development, 
launch and sustainment of the Global Positioning System, the world’s premier 
navigation and timing standard. 
2. Space Superiority Systems Directorate (SY): is responsible for equipping the 
joint warfighter with both offensive and defensive counterspace, space 
situation awareness and special access required capabilities required to gain, 
maintain and exploit space superiority. 
3. Launch and Range Systems Directorate (LR): provides DOD and the National 
Reconnaissance Office with assured access to space through launch systems 
modernization, sustainment and development of worldwide range capability 
for all national security missions. 
4. Space-Based Infrared Systems Directorate (SBIRS): develops, deploys, and 
sustains surveillance satellites and ground stations to detect, track, and report 
global and theater ballistic missile attacks against the United States, its allies 
and combat forces. 
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5. Defense Weather Systems Directorate (DWSS): equips worldwide strategic 
and tactical forces with weather and space environmental data for planning 
and executing aerospace, ground and naval operations. 
6. Military Satellite Communication (MILSATCOM) Directorate: plans for, 
acquires and sustains space-enabled global communications in support of the 
president, secretary of defense and combat forces. 
7. Space Logistics Directorate (SL): sustains and modifies worldwide 
USAF/DOD space weapon systems to include terrestrial and space weather, 
global positioning systems, launch range control, satellite command and 
control, secure communications, and missiles early warning. 
8. Missile Defense Systems Division (MDS): its mission objectives include 
developing space technologies that support the Missile Defense Agency’s 
space assets. These technologies include sensors, space qualified components, 
optics and algorithms. 
9. Space Development and Test Directorate (SDT): serves as primary provider of 
launch, spaceflight and on-orbit operations for entire the DOD space research 
and development community. 
10. Spacelift Range and Network System Division (SRN): is responsible for 
modernizing and sustaining the world-wide Air Force Satellite Control 
Network as well as the nation’s Launch and Test Range System located at 
Vandenberg AFB, Calif. and Cape Canaveral AFS, Fla. 
11. Contracting Directorate (PK): is responsible for providing comprehensive 
advice and effective contract management to the space community and for the 
timely execution of acquiring superior weapon systems. 
a. There are several elements that fall under PK. These include: 
i. Contract Price/Cost Analysis which is responsible for 
providing acquisition pricing support for highly complex, high 
monetary value, and long term acquisitions for major weapon 
systems. 
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ii. Contract management which is responsible for contract 
distribution, competition, contract closeout, on-orbit incentives, 
protests, warranties, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
concerns. 
iii. Resource management: is responsible for training, personnel, 
and awards. 
2. Ties to DCAA and DCMA 
In addition to the military and civilians who work in these directorates and 
divisions; SMC is also staffed by DCAA Financial Liaison Advisors (FLAs) who also 
provide accounting and auditing services to the base. Some of their responsibilities 
(DCAA/FLA, January 2013) are: 
o Improve coordination and establish ways to identify, evaluate, and resolve 
issues 
o Facilitate DCAA’s ability to provide quality, timely and responsive audit 
and assurance services 
o Facilitating attendance of field auditors at negotiations when an audit 
report has been issued 
DCMA also has a staff assigned to the base. This individual is an engineer by 
profession and provides some of the following services: 
o Serves as the DCMA Customer Liaison Representative (CLR) to a major 
Military Service or Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) buying activity that 
is the proponent for multiple, high-dollar DOD weapon systems, logistics 
and support contracts. 
o Functions as the primary representative of DCMA to the customer 
organization where the following key areas of responsibility may be 
applicable:  
1. Monitors and evaluates customer satisfaction with DCMA pre- and 
post-award contract management support and connects customer 
with appropriate part of the DCMA enterprise to resolve customer 
issues. 
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2. Applies analytical and evaluative techniques to the identification, 
consideration, and resolution of systemic customer issues or 
problems with DCMA products or services. 
3. Actively promotes, and may be a direct participant in, Acquisition 
Planning and Support Services (APSS) activities. Interfaces with 
military service Senior Acquisition Executives (SAEs), Program 
Executive Officers (PEOs), and Program managers (PMs).  
4. Responds to customer inquiries and concerns and serves as a 
conduit of information between the customer and various DCMA 
field activities.  
The last part of this section will address the results of a Spring 2012 meeting 
(SMC Meeting, March 2012) between various SMC directors and members from both 
DCAA and DCMA. This open forum’s purpose was to address the concerns SMC had 
regarding DCAA and DCMA’s performance. The following is a summary of the 
concerns, issues, and opportunity for improvement. We have paraphrased their 
comments, below. Not all of the directorates provided input. 
 
Directorates who provided input:  
1. Global Positioning 
a. Concerns: Not applicable 
b. Issues: Needs DCMA’s assistance in signing off on the DD 250 forms 
c. Opportunities for improvement: Not applicable 
2. Space-Based Infrared Systems 
a. Concerns: Limited resources to cover both DCAA and DCMA’s 
review and expertise 
b. Issues: DCAA and DCMA needs to improve their assistance with 
Should-Cost Reviews and validation of Life Cycle Cost Database 
c. Opportunities for improvement: DCAA and DCMA have done well to 
prioritize and communicate concerns with meeting the directorate’s 
expectations 
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3. Contracting Directorate: Addressing DCAA. 
a. Concerns: The various program offices tailor the audits in order to 
adequately address the specific areas that require more attention to 
support negotiations. There is a lack of DCAA presents when a 
systems audit is incomplete. Without timely audit support, the price 
negotiation team is unable to confidently support execution of program 
requirements at a level of fidelity that protects the taxpayer. The 
various contractors are able to utilize new rates under the auspice that 
DCAA is too slow to evaluate the rates thus leaving the Government 
without options to compare the rates and determine cost 
reasonableness. 
b. Issues:  
i. DCAA has failed to provide tailored audits when requested. 
ii. System audit and disclosure statements are not being readily 
audited as more resources are diverted towards negotiations. 
iii. Audit completion timeliness is still a significant issue and does 
not seem to improve with the recent DCAA implemented 
changes. 
c. Opportunities for improvement:  
i. There must be increased communication between DCAA and 
the various program offices so that both parties can explain the 
requirements for tailoring audits prior to initiating changes on 
audit requests. 
ii. Allocate additional resources to continue thorough system 
audits and disclosure statements. 
iii. DCAA should keep a metric system that tracks audit requests 
and is readily available to the program offices to track 
successful progression and allow transparency. 
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iv. Initiate stricter guidance on proposing new rates to the 
Government when dealing with Forward Pricing Rate 
recommendation (FPRRs). 
4. Contracting Directorate: Addressing DCMA. 
a. Concerns:  
i. Contractors such as Northrop, Boeing, and Lockheed require 
such a large threshold to facilitate review that rate support is 
not often provided for potential contracts of <$200 million. 
ii. Contracts are not being developed in a manner that would 
allow administrative ease to ensure protection of Government 
property. 
b. Issues:  
i. Potential contracts of <$200 million are still considered high 
magnitude and therefore still requires DCMA’s attention. 
ii. Without administrative ease, there is a potential for unrealized 
efficiency gains. 
c. Opportunities for improvement: 
i. Devise a better application of the threshold when dealing with 
larger companies. 
ii. DCMA should have a more active role in pre-award activities 
(i.e. Request for Proposal (RFP) development, the Solicitation 
Review Boards, negotiations, clause development) to assist in 
the administration of contracts and also ensure Government 
property is properly handled. 
5. Space Superiority Directorate: Addressing DCAA. 
a. Concerns: 
i. FPRRs become outdated in such an expeditious manner that 
they prove to be unhelpful with pricing actions. 
ii. DCAA is unresponsive when help is required. 
b. Issues: 
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i. DCAA guidance is unclear when FPRRs are going to be 
updated. 
ii. Overall, SMC’s concerns with DCAA are not being addressed. 
c. Opportunities for improvement: Space Superiority did not have any 
listed opportunities. 
6. Launch and Range (LR) Directorate: Addressing DCAA. 
a. Concern: DCAA audit timelines seem to be extremely excessive. 
b. Issues: 
i. DCAA audits take approximately ¼ to ½ of the schedule from 
the RFP release to contract award. For example, a typical 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Launch Services 
(ELS) contract mission takes approximately 11 to 12 months to 
get on contact. DCAA audit reviews have taken at least four 
months to complete and are a heavy schedule driver. There is a 
lot of pressure and frustration in that it takes a long time to 
complete these audits especially when there is pressure to 
award a contractual effort/mission in a shorter time. 
ii. There needs to be flexibility with respect to DCAA and a 
“Quality Proposal.” 
iii. How will DCAA (and DCMA) deal with a commercial new 
entrant like SPACEX? This is especially challenging since 
FAR Part 15, certified pricing may not be applicable. 
c. Opportunities for improvement: The directorate is willing to work with 
DCAA to be reasonable and help in reduce/compress their reviews. 
7. Launch and Range Directorate: Addressing DCMA. 
a. Concern: Audits in support of the EELV Acquisition Strategy 
b. Issue: The Air Force is contemplating a large lot buy for EELV. The 
Acquisition Strategy may have the Air Force buying five years of 
launches in FY13. This could generate a significant number of assist 
audits that will require DCAA and DCMA support. 
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c. Opportunity for improvement: LR would like to continue working 
with DCAA and DCMA to ensure they are prepared for the surge in 
assist audit requests. 
3. Space Command Challenges 
As this paper is currently being written, across the board cutbacks known as 
“sequestration” have taken effect. The DOD and its services have been mandated to 
reduce costs by a fixed percentage. The DOD simply cannot afford to conduct business as 
usual. One example of an ambitious effort to reduce costs comes from SMC. 
In an article written in Space News (Fersten, May 2013), the Air Force Space and 
Missile Systems Center expects to save $1 billion from its space acquisition portfolio 
over the next five years. This reduction will primarily come from reduced oversight of 
key programs. 
According to Lt. Gen. Ellen Pawlikowski, commander of SMC, there are several 
satellite and launch programs that are currently being targeted for such reductions. The 
Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) secure satellite communication program is 
a prime example. Under a multibillion dollar contract, this program is anticipated to save 
more than $600 million by purchasing five AEHF satellites from a single prime 
contractor–Lockheed Martin Space Systems, located in Sunnyvale, CA. These savings 
were generated by streamlining of the production flow and test schedule and reducing by 
nearly half the number of reports from 78 to 42 as required from Lockheed. Reductions in 
both the number of meetings on the program and the number of people who had to attend 
also were factors. As a result of these and other cost saving measures, the AEHF 
production times have been reduced from 73 months for the fourth satellite in the series 
to 63 months for the fifth. Finally, the funding documents for 2012 and 2013 show a large 
drop in projected funding for the evolutionary AEHF upgrades of about $686 million. 
Other satellite systems such as the Wideband Global Satcom communications 
system (transition from development to production), the GPS 3 satellite navigation 
system (still in development), and the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) have all 
benefitted from the application of these efficiencies. 
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The Air Force’s largest program, in dollar terms, is the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. Essentially, EELV is used to launch almost all 
operational U.S. military satellites. The prime contractor for the EELV effort is United 
Launch Alliance of Denver, CO which consists of a joint venture between Boeing and 
Lockheed Martin. 
In order to reduce the exorbitant cost of launch activities, the Air Force has 
introduced competition into the mix. According to the article (Fersten, May 2013), the 
Air Force is within days of reaching an agreement with Space Exploration Technologies 
Corp (SpaceX) located in Hawthorne, CA. The plan is to certify SpaceX’s Falcon rockets 
to carry the military payloads into space. The pair of satellites includes the civilian Deep 
Space Climate Observatory and the Space Test Program-2. Their missions are scheduled 
for 2014 and 2015, respectively. 
D. DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICY 
This paper would not be complete without mentioning a third component to the 
auditing and acquisition management life-cycle, namely Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP). According to DPAP’s website, DPAP is responsible for all 
contracting and procurement policy matters in the DOD. DPAP executes that policy 
through the timely update of the DFARS, PGI, and DOD Directive 5000.1&.2. 
In his 4 January 2011 memorandum (Assad, 2011), Mr. Shay Assad, Director, 
DPAP echoed the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics (AT&L) in a memorandum dated 14 September 2010, calling for better work 
alignment and reduction in Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) / Defense Contract 
Management Agency (DCMA) overlap. Based on this memorandum, the Directors of 
DPAP, DCAA, and DCMA have committed themselves to the following actions: 
1. Increased Thresholds for Cost/Price Proposal Audits 
Although the threshold for DCAA on cost type proposal audits is greater than 
$100M and fixed price proposals greater than $10M, there is concern whether DCMA is 
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adequately prepared in both resources and training to perform audit functions that were 
inherently DCAA’s to begin with, such as reviewing proposed contract rates. 
2. Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs) / Forward Pricing Rate
 Recommendations (FPRRs) 
DCMA will be the single agency responsible for issuing all FPRAs and FPRRs 
for contractors where DCMA is the cognizant contract administration office. In those 
cases where DCAA has completed an audit of the contractor’s rates, then DCMA will 
adopt the DCAA recommended position. 
At first glance, this sounds like the two agencies working in harmony, however, in 
order for DCAA to adequately provide DCMA with an audit opinion on the rates, it is 
absolutely imperative that the contractors start providing the cognizant DCAA office with 
adequate proposal packages and to immediately stop issuing audit packages that are not 
in compliance with FAR, DFARS, CAS, and other regulations. There have been many 
times where DCAA has needed to return the contractor’s proposal rate packages because 
key data was missing. It would be both prudent and an effective use of resources to sit 
down with the contractor and review the guidance and regulations so that adequate 
packages will be submitted without delay. 
3. Financial Capability Reviews 
To further increase their cooperative spirit, DCAA will no longer be performing 
these types of reviews, as they will be handled by DCMA. This is in accordance with 
FAR Part 9.106 and DFARS PGI part 209.106. DCMA has established a Financial 
Analysis Division under its Cost and Pricing Center to handle this added task. 
4. Purchasing Systems Reviews 
Although DCAA is responsible for auditing the contractor’s internal controls 
(including the purchase system), DCMA is now handling the function of conducting 
Contractor Purchasing System Reviews in accordance with FAR Part 44.3 and DFARS 
Part 244.3. DCAA’s function will be to audit subcontract costs as part of its incurred cost 
audits and subsequently report any deficiencies in the contractor’s system to the 
cognizant ACO for corrective action. 
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5. Contractor Business Systems Rule 
On 24 February 2012, the DOD (DFARS, 2012) published a final rule amending 
DFARS regarding contractor business systems. With only minor changes from the 
interim rule (effective as of 18 May 2011), the final rule provides for oversight of a 
contractor’s business systems and empowers the government to withhold payments on 
contracts when a Contracting officer determines that a contractor’s system contains 
“significant deficiencies.” As defined, those “significant deficiencies” are a “shortcoming 
in the system that materially affects the ability of officials of the DOD to rely upon 
information produced by the system that is needed for management purposes.” Once a 
significant deficiency is identified, the contractor must be promptly notified in writing 
and an evaluation process by the Contracting officer begins.”  
The final rule applies to all contracts governed by the Cost Accounting Standards 
(CAS) and regulates six categories of “business systems”—Accounting Systems, 
Estimating Systems, Earned Value Management Systems, Purchasing Systems, Material 
Management and Accounting Systems, and Property Management Systems. The 
regulation is implemented by a contract clause that, where inserted, allows the 
Contracting officer to withhold 5 percent of payments where there are one or more 
deficiencies in a single business system and up to ten percent if deficiencies are spread 
across multiple business systems. These business systems are monitored by both DCAA 
and DCMA. 
E. SUMMARY OF THE ACQUISITION  
Regardless of how one chooses to divide up the responsibilities of the DOD 
acquisition process, as detailed on the acquisition “horse blanket chart” (Appendix C), the 
process relies on inputs from DCAA, DCMA and the DOD Buying Commands in order 
to bring required goods and services from the marketplace to the battlefield. Should one 
“leg” of the stool fail, the entire process is adversely affected, see Figure 1. While the  
three acquisition entities are, justifiably, separate organizations, their individual missions 
and outputs have created a situation where it is critical for these organizations to work 




Figure 1.   The Acquisition Community as a Three-Legged Stool 
As an example of inter-agency teaming, both DCAA and DCMA have jointly 
sponsored the Cost Recovery Initiative (CRI) to aggressively target outstanding audit 
report actions. These actions are generally the result of contractor noncompliance with 
CAS and the successful resolution requires both agencies to tightly coordinate and 
teamwork between the auditor and KO. As mentioned in the Director’s Year in Review 
(Fitzgerald, 2013), DCAA and DCMA have resolved nearly 500 of the approximately 
700 audits originally identified as requiring resolution. This coordination resulted in the 
CO requesting that over $600 million be returned to the U.S. Treasury.  
It is apparent that the level of cooperation required among the DOD acquisition 
entities will demand a superior level of communication and process flow to incorporate 
all three entities. 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
On 30 April 2007 the Deputy Secretary of Defense (England, 2007), issued a 
memorandum to all Department of Defense entities establishing a program office within 
the DOD solely responsible for the tracking of Lean Six-Sigma processes within the 
DOD and calling for “aggressive implementation” of these processes “within all levels of 
DOD.” 
Within the DOD acquisition community, we historically think of ourselves as 
members of independent agencies and/or commands. While this is true, we must change 
our frame of reference to think of ourselves as subsections of one common process- DOD 
Acquisition. Similar to a production line, items must pass through a number of stations on 
the figurative “production line” before they are fielded, from design to quality control to 
payment.  In the spirit of the Deputy Secretary’s memo, and based on our research, we 
believe there is ample opportunity to fortify the “three legged stool” of DOD acquisition 
by applying lean six sigma principles on a macro-level, addressing the relationships 
across the three acquisition entities. 
B. LEAN SIX SIGMA PRINCIPLES 
As presented by the Naval Postgraduate School’s Mike Boudreau, (Boudreau, 
2012), Lean Six-Sigma processes may be used within all business areas, and are not 
limited to simply physical production. Authors Braswell and Lichtig have evolved lean 
six sigma (LSS) from simply a “process,” applied within the constraints of a physical 
process, to a “theory” where by its principles may be applied to organizational 
relationships, such as the “three-legged stool” of the DOD acquisition community.  
LSS theory aims to lower cost by streamlining operations and processes to create 
efficiency. Under “traditional” process improvement theory, organizations set up controls 
to detect and correct defects or errors. These organizations would then focus on creating 
uniform standards of conformance. In contrast, LSS theory focuses on redefining the 
business process itself, with the goal that defects, or “muda” (waste), are never created in 
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the first place. Former CEO of General Electric, Jack Welsh, successfully implemented 
LSS at GE in 1995. Since that time, his story has become a textbook case study on the 
implementation of LSS processes. Successful implementation of LSS (George, 2004) 
follows the following steps: 
1. Define and identify key business processes 
2. Measure current performance levels, capabilities, customer needs and 
expectations 
3. Analyze performance levels/trends and identify problems 
4. Improve benchmark solutions, including a cost/benefit analysis 
5. Control process variables, especially any exerting excess influence. 
Standardize processes and integrate into the system. 
While LSS is most commonly applied to manufacturing processes where 
quantitative data can be collected and analyzed in real-time, we recognize that the DOD 
acquisition process does not operate at the same pace as a production line. That being 
said, we have also observed that LSS theory has been commonly and successfully applied 
to qualitative processes, such as in “Lean Accounting Systems.” The commonly stated 
goals (Braswell, 2004) for these more qualitative lean systems are: 
1. To provide more accurate, timely, and understandable information. This serves to 
improve decision-making. 
2. To eliminate waste from the business processes without yielding financial or 
internal control. 
3. To maintain full compliance with applicable laws and regulations. 
4. To provide information that is relevant and actionable. 
Based on the authors’ research and experience, we have observed an opportunity 
for applying these lean principles to the DOD Acquisition process to serve as a force-
multiplier and increase the efficiency and value of Acquisition operations. 
C. DEFINE KEY BUSINESS PROCESSES 
As discussed in our “Literature Review” section (Chapter II), the DOD 
Acquisition process consists of three major DOD organizations—The buying command, 
DCMA, and DCAA. All non-commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) items acquired by the 
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DOD must pass through a complex process that includes multiple inputs from each of 
these organizations. Consolidated and visually depicted on what is colloquially known as 
the “Horse-blanket Chart” (Appendix C), the Acquisition process includes five phases: 
1. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
2. Technology Development Phase 
3. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
4. Production and Deployment Phase 
5. Operations and Support Phase 
Each of these phases consists of an extensive amount of sub-activities and tasks, 
the total of which may take from a few months to several years to complete. Each phase 
concludes with a Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), where critical decisions must be 
made before the next phase can be initiated. 
Materiel Solution Analysis Phase - As defined by DOD Instruction (DoDI) 
5000.02 (Carter, 2013) the Materiel Solution Analysis phase is designed to assess all 
possible materiel solutions to the needs identified by the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) in order to meet the Nation’s National Defense Strategy. The Phase 
consists chiefly of an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), guided by the Initial Capabilities 
Document (ICD), and focuses on identification and analysis of alternatives, measures of 
effectiveness, cost, schedule, concepts of operations, and overall risk. The AoA also 
assesses the Critical Technology Elements (CTEs) associated with each proposed 
materiel solution, including technology maturity, integration risk, manufacturing 
feasibility, and technology maturation and demonstration needs. This phase concludes 
with the “Milestone A decision,” where the MDA makes formal decisions concerning the 
capabilities required and the strategy that will be used to acquire them (Acquisition 
Program or COTS). The MDA decisions are documented in an Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM).   
Technology Development Phase - The completion of the Milestone A decision by 
the MDA authorizes entry into the Technology Development Phase. The goal of this 
phase is to reduce technology risk, determine and mature the appropriate set of 
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technologies to be integrated into a full system, and to demonstrate CTEs on prototypes. 
This is a developmental phase characterized by continuous technology discovery and 
development resulting from teaming between the contractors, buying commands, and 
program managers. Guided by the ICD and the Technology Development Strategy, the 
goal is to assess the viability of various technologies while simultaneously refining user 
requirements, leading to the production of the Capability Development Document 
(CDD). This assessment often includes competitive prototyping by prospective 
contractors to demonstrate or test critical technologies on a component level. At its 
conclusion, the Phase has identified an affordable program or increment of militarily 
useful capability. The technology and manufacturing processes for that program or 
increment have been assessed and demonstrated in a relevant environment, and the 
manufacturing risks have been identified. The phase ends at the Milestone B decision, 
with the MDA approving a final CDD and authorizing initial production. 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase - The Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development Phase begins after the Milestone B decision. This phase 
consists of two major efforts - Integrated System Design, and System Capability and 
Manufacturing Process Demonstration, separated by the Post-Critical Design Review 
Assessment (Post-CDR A). The first part, ISD, should define system functionality and 
interfaces, complete hardware and software detailed design, and reduce system-level risk. 
ISD then concludes with the Post-CDR A, where the MDA makes an assessment of the 
system’s design maturity and compares to the program outcomes specified in the 
Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). Following the Post-CDR A, the program begins 
System Capability and Manufacturing Process Demonstration. This includes 
demonstrations of the ability of the system to meet the defined key performance 
parameters (KPP’s), and that system production can be supported by demonstrated 
manufacturing processes. Once the system has been proven to meet requirements and 
manufacturing processes have been effectively demonstrated, the MDA must reach a 
Milestone C decision, which concludes the development phase and authorizes the 
initiation of the production phase.  
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Production and Deployment Phase - The goal of the Production and Deployment 
Phase is to achieve an operational capability that satisfies mission needs. This can be 
divided into two functional parts—Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate 
Production (FRP). Based on the CDD established at milestone B, the program manager 
works with contractors to begin LRIP and establish a production process, as well as 
baselines for the program. Intensive testing is completed to refine the production process, 
and ultimately lead to the Full Rate Production Design Review (FRPDR) by the MDA. 
Once the MDA provides the FRPDR approval, the program manager can initiate full rate 
production. The MDA then completes a Full Deployment Decision Review (FDDR) and 
authorizes the system to be fielded. 
Operations and Support Phase - The Operations and Support phase completes the 
acquisition life cycle, and carries the process through fielding and eventually disposal.  
The goal is to establish a support program that meets the program readiness and support 
requirements, and sustains the system in the most cost-effective manner. Life-cycle 
sustainment includes tailored product support to achieve both specified and evolving 
support availability, reliability, and affordability. Product support can include many 
areas, including supply, maintenance, transportation, sustainment engineering, data 
management, Human Systems Integration (HSI), environmental considerations, safety, 
supportability, and interoperability. Once a system has reached the end of its life, it must 
be demilitarized and disposed of in accordance with all legal and regulatory requirements 
and policy relating to safety, security, and the environment. The useful life of a program 
can vary from a few years, such as in the case of the F-84 Thunderjet (Fact Sheet, 2011), 
to more than half a century, such as B-52 (still in active service after 62 years) (Boeing, 
2014). 
1. Business Processes 
Peeling back the very complex top layer of the Acquisition Process shown on the 
Horse Chart (Appendix C), we can observe the process is powered by numerous 
individual business transactions. Taking place between a combination of Buying 
Commands, Contractors, DCMA and DCAA, these transactions may consist of a few 
individual short-term contracts, or hundreds of very complex contracts spanning many 
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decades. Often overlooked as a whole, the “footprint” of this three-legged stool within 
the DOD Acquisition process is massive, and has a direct effect on almost every element 
of the process. While the significance of contracts in the production phase is obvious, the 
reality is that the teaming of the three entities of the three-legged stool is critical in every 
single phase. Examples of these business processes include: 
Materiel Solution Analysis Phase - Buying Commands and program managers 
work with DCMA (who in-turn works with potential contractors) to analyze source-
selection considerations and materiel solution alternatives leading up to the Milestone A 
decision. 
Technology Development Phase - Technology development contracts are issued 
and closed out (see contract life cycle, below). Supported by DCMA, Request for 
Proposals (RFP’s) are developed and issued, and Production Support strategies are 
developed by the Buying Command/PM.  
Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase - Development contracts are 
issued and closed out. Monitored by DCMA and coordinated by the Buying Command, 
the production of prototypes begins. The product support plan and product support 
capability are also established between DCMA, the Buying Command, and the 
contractors. 
Production and Deployment Phase - The “meat” of the Acquisition process, LRIP 
and FRP contracts are awarded and executed. Production is monitored by DCMA 
contract, industrial, and quality control specialists and coordinated with the buying 
command. 
Operations and Support Phase - FRP contracts continue to be executed, and 
DCMA continues production monitoring, however this phase also includes disposal. 
Disposal may consist of simply FRP contract closeout, or it may consist of entirely new 
contracts being awarded, executed and closed to adhere to laws and regulations unique to 
the disposal of the system. 
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2. The Contract Life Cycle 
As mentioned, almost every step in the DOD Acquisition process consists of the 
issuance of one or multiple contracts. Each contract issued must progress through a series 
of steps that are common across all contracts. This process is initiated as soon as a need is 
identified by the Buying Command.  
3. Proposal, Award and Negotiations 
The Command works with DCMA to compose and publish a request for proposal 
(RFP). Contractors will submit proposals to the buying commands in response to the 
RFP. These proposals are then routed in one of two ways: Small-dollar or low-risk (to the 
government) proposals may be routed to a DCMA or Buying Command cost-price 
analyst who will review the proposal to determine its reasonableness and provide advice 
to the Buying Command’s Contracting officer, responsible for awarding the contract. For 
more complex or significant contracts, the Buying Command will request a formal 
GAGAS-compliant audit from the DCAA. These DCAA audits result in formal audit 
reports containing detailed analysis and findings, as well as a formal audit opinion on the 
reasonableness of the proposal with regard to the FAR. Additionally, at the request of the 
Contracting officer, DCAA can perform an Accounting System Review to provide a 
formal opinion on whether the potential contractor’s accounting system is designed to 
track costs in accordance with the FAR. The Buying Command’s Contracting officer can 
then use DCAA’s findings as a basis for pricing negotiations with the contractor at the 
time the contract is awarded.  
4. Contract Performance 
Following the award of a contract by the Buying Command, the contractors begin 
performance on the contract. There are over 70 administrative functions detailed in the 
FAR related to contract administration during the performance process. For production 
contracts, DCMA will have Industrial and Quality Assurance Specialists on-site to 
monitor the contractor’s performance and report to the Buying Command. With long-
term contracts, the Buying Command may also pass off administration of the contract to 
DCMA. As defined by FAR 42.302(a), administration includes monitoring billings, 
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billing rates, contract limitations, annual escalations, and determining the allowability of 
costs. The DCAA supports both the Buying Command and DCMA during the 
administration process during the contract performance phase in a number of ways, 
providing the following services: 
 Paid Voucher Reviews - Evaluates the validity of the contractor’s billings. 
 Labor Floorchecks - Evaluates the validity and control over labor costs. 
 Material Existence and Consumption Checks- Evaluates the validity and 
control over direct material costs. 
 Incurred Cost Audits - Evaluates the costs incurred and claimed by the 
contractor during a given year under the criteria described in FAR 31. 
 Forward Pricing Audits - Evaluates proposed pricing rates to be used in 
contract modifications and add-ons for reasonableness and allowability. 
 Provisional Billing Rate Audits - Evaluates proposed billing rates for a 
given year. 
These services performed by DCAA are used by either the Contracting officer or 
DCMA to monitor and administer the contract during contract performance. 
5. Contract Closing 
The final step in the contract life cycle is the contract closing process. Contracts 
may be closed for a variety of reasons, ranging from full contract completion to 
reductions in funding to termination at will by the contracting officer. Once a contract is 
ready to be closed, each entity on the Acquisition team has a responsibility. First, DCAA 
must complete all outstanding incurred cost audits, and provide DCMA an opinion on the 
allowability, allocability, and reasonableness of the contractor’s claimed costs under FAR 
part 31. Next, DCMA must complete the contract close-out paperwork, including a 
release of claims form, and close the contract in DCMA’s contract management system 
(MOCAS). The contractor must sign the release of claims form and return it to DCMA to 
attest that they have complete work on the contract and have no further contract costs to 
be claimed, or billed to the government. Once the contract has been closed out, the 
Buying Command is notified that the contract is complete. In some instances where 
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contracts are prematurely terminated at-will by the Contracting officer, DCAA is called 
in by the Contracting officer to perform an Audit of Termination Costs. Under FAR part 
49, when contracts are terminated by the Contracting officer prior to completion, 
contractors are entitled to claim certain costs incurred as part of the contracting effort. 
DCAA’s Termination Audit examines these claimed costs and issues an opinion to the 
contracting officer concerning the validity of the contractor’s claimed termination costs.  
3. Summary of Key Business Processes 
The DOD Acquisition process is a very lengthy, complicated process made up of 
numerous sub-processes. All of these processes occur between some combination of the 
key acquisition entities- Buying Commands, DCMA and DCAA. A closer look at the 
details of the Acquisition process reveals that the entire process is driven by a series of 
contracts, each of which must pass through its own individual life cycle. Based on the 
identification of the contract life cycle as the driver of the process, the following key 
processes have been identified: 
 Contract Award (Appendix D) 
 Contract Billings/Administration (Appendix E) 
 Contract Closing (Appendix F) 
D. MEASURE CURRENT PERFORMANCE LEVELS 
Ultimately, DOD Acquisitions are governed by two things: Capabilities required 
in support of the National Defense Strategy, and the Federal Budget. Congress is required 
by the Constitution to appropriate funds to fund acquisition programs. These 
appropriations bills are the legal granting of authority by Congress to the requesting 
department to incur obligations related to the request in the name of the Federal 
Government. An “obligation” is the legal reservation of funds to make a future payment 
of money. The obligation is incurred as soon as an order is placed, or a contract is 
awarded for the delivery of goods and/or performance of services.  
The obligation period for appropriated funds depends on the nature of the 
program, see Table 3. 
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Military Personnel MILPERS Annual 
Research and Development, 
Testing and Evaluation 
RDT&E 2 years 
Procurement PROC 3 years (*5 years for 
Shipbuilding) 
Military Construction MILCON 5 years  
Table 3.   “Color of Money” 
Once funds are appropriated, the budget authority is distributed throughout the 
DOD, and ultimately to the buying commands, through the Apportionment process. As 
an example, once congress appropriates PROC funding, the Buying Command has three 
years to award contracts from the appropriated funds before their budget authority 
expires. Each contract awarded is then subject to a five year expenditure period. This 
means that from the time the obligation was incurred, the Buying Command has five 
years to 1) ensure the obligation has been satisfied, and 2) to pay from the Treasury.  
The federal budgeting process, driven by obligation and expenditure deadlines, 
ultimately governs the contracting process. We conclude, therefore, that the most critical 
measurement in the Acquisition process is time. 
1. Contract Award 
Going back to the Horse-chart (Appendix C), before a Milestone A, B, C or the 
FRPDR can be authorized, some degree of source selection or contract award must occur. 
The award of a contract represents an obligation on behalf of the Buying Command. 
Given the obligation periods proscribed for the various appropriation categories (above), 
these contracts must be issued within that window. In order for the contract awarded, a 
series of steps must take place. Beginning with the process of drafting the RFP, proposals 
must be collected and analyzed. Not only does each step in this process take time, but it 
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involves each of the acquisition entities- DCAA, DCMA, and the Buying Command- to 
perform independent processes that must fall in-line to complete the contract award. A 
survey of current (as of 2014) RFP’s on the FBO’s website (FBO.gov) shows numerous 
RFP’s that remain open for approximately two months. After all proposals are received, 
buying command cost-price analysts must complete evaluations of each proposal.  
At this point in the process, the workflow branches out to the other agencies. For 
example, the cost-price analyst will contact DCMA to review technical data, such as the 
proposed labor hours and/or to determine whether the prospective contractor has a 
Comprehensive Small Business Subcontracting Plan (DFARS 252.219). DCMA will 
conduct their technical review and issue a formal report to the Buying Command 
detailing their conclusions. Concurrently, the cost-price analyst will contact DCAA to 
request a FPRP Audit to determine the validity of the proposed pricing rates, and, in 
many cases, a Pre-Award Accounting System Survey (Pre-Award) to determine whether 
the contractor’s accounting system is designed to monitor costs in accordance with FAR 
part 31. For each of these procedures, DCAA will conduct a formal, GAGAS compliant 
audit and issue an audit report documenting their conclusions and providing the 
supporting data for those conclusions. During FY 2012, a FPRP Audit took DCAA an 
average of 110 days to complete (Fitzgerald, 2013).  
Once the cost-price analyst receives the results from DCAA and DCMA, they 
must then integrate the findings of these reports into their proposal analysis. The buying 
command team then initiates negotiations, and ultimately awards a contract. Overall, the 
process could take well over 12 months, depending on the complexity of the proposal.  
2. Contract Billings/Administration (Performance) 
As mentioned, there are over 70 administrative contract functions detailed in the 
FAR. For our purposes, we will highlight the billing process as an example of the current 
contract workflow.   
Each year, contractors provide DCMA or the Buying Command with provisional 
billing rate proposals. The rates proposed represent the rates for the upcoming year based 
on contractor’s estimate of the future year’s costs. The responsible party (DCMA or the 
56 
Buying Command) is responsible for determining whether the proposed rates are 
reasonable, usually by requesting a Provisional Billing Rate Audit from DCAA. Once an 
audit is requested, DCAA initiates its audit procedures and conducts a formal audit in 
compliance with GAGAS, and issues an audit report detailing its findings. When the 
responsible party approves the rates, they are granting the contractor permission to bill 
the government using the approved rates during the subject year. Provisional Billing 
Rates are also used by Contracting officers as a tool for negotiating and pricing follow-on 
contracts.  
3. Contract Closing  
As a contract is completed, a number of closing procedures must be performed. 
First, the Buying Command must perform an inspection and determine that the good or 
service provided is acceptable and meets the performance parameters described in the 
contract’s statement of work. Next, DCMA must complete the required administrative 
procedures to close out the contract, chiefly to determine and finalize the costs claimed 
by the contractor for payment. In doing this, DCMA relies heavily upon formal audit 
reports issued by DCAA stating an opinion on whether the contractor’s claimed costs are 
reasonable, allocable and allowable under the FAR. DCAA’s audit reports also detail the 
costs questioned as a result of their examination, and the basis for questioning the costs. 
DCAA performs these Incurred Cost Audits for each year of costs incurred under the 
contract. Once the audit report is received, DCMA reviews DCAA’s audit findings and 
either sustains or dissents on the individual questioned costs to determine the final 
amount of costs and fee that will be awarded to the contractor. It is important to note that 
final payment cannot be made until the contract has been closed out. Under the federal 
budgeting process, once the buying command has entered into an obligation (awarded a 
contract); they have a five year limit in which they must make payments. Any appropriate 
funds that have not been expended within five years of the obligation are returned to the 
Treasury, or “expire.” This means that from the contract closing process must be 
completed within five years of the obligation of the appropriated funds. 
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E. ANALYZE BUSINESS PROCESSES 
The following represents the authors’ conclusions based on their subject matter 
research, masters-level studies at the Naval Postgraduate School, and work experience as 
DCAA Auditor, Air Force Cost-Price Analyst, and Assistant Controller for Lean 
Accounting Systems. We will analyze the contract life cycle business processes from 
multiple perspectives on the Acquisition team, such as that of a cost-price analyst and 
auditor. 
1. Air Force Cost/Price Analyst’s Perspective: Revised Statement of 
Work 
For our purposes, we will examine a scenario where the cost-price analyst is 
working on a sole source effort and that the RFP has been written, submitted, and 
approved. In author Lichtig’s opinion, the timeliness problem begins at the buying 
command level or higher up (depending on the acquisition effort in question). For 
example, in procuring a satellite which can take up to seven years to build and launch, the 
RFP may be time sensitive thus giving the prime contractor only a few months or less to 
submit their proposal. If the prime has several subcontractors in mind, then they too will 
need to submit their proposals in a timely manner. All of these must be coordinated. 
There have been numerous times when the prime/subcontractor submitted their 
proposals in a timely manner, and the Government team started to analyze them only to 
have the buying command submit a new statement of work (SOW). A new SOW forces 
the contractors to revise and resubmit their proposals. Once the prime/sub submitted their 
new revised proposals, an analysis was conducted on both the original and revised 
proposals to see where the differences were and, if feasible, the Government team was 
able to pick up from where they left off. The goal was not to duplicate prior effort. 
One such example occurred during the production of the AEHF Space Vehicle 
(SV) 4 satellite. The existing AEHF prime contractor, Lockheed Martin Space Systems 
Company submitted its original proposal for the SV4 production effort on 17 May 2010, 
and subsequently revised it on 11 June 2010 and 09 July 2010, for a final proposed price 
of $2.118B. 
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In changing the original requirements of the satellite, the Government required the 
prime/sub to re-submit multiple proposals which created time pressures for both the 
contractor and Government teams, as well as sky rocketing proposal preparation costs 
into the millions of dollars. Decisions were made to revise the SOW without considering 
the tangible effects of the change on the down-stream process, specifically on the 
completion dates and the proposal costs.  
Yet another common breakdown in the contract life cycle centers on the lack of 
Forward Pricing Rate Agreements (FPRAs). In the not too distant past, DCAA would 
receive a binder full of rate information from the contractor, annually. For direct labor 
and indirect rates, it usually covered up to five out-years. DCAA would perform their 
audit of the information, and at the same time, DCMA would perform their own analysis. 
At a given point in time, the DCMA – Divisional Administrative Contracting officer 
(DACO) would review both reports and come up with the Government’s official position. 
A meeting with the contractor would then follow and negotiations of the FPRA would 
commence. Once everyone (Government and contractor) agreed to the rates, the FPRA 
was published and distributed. 
The benefit of having established FPRAs for both direct and indirect rates plus 
COM factors was that it expedited analysis of future proposals. Since the rates were 
agreed to by both parties in advance, the expectation was that proposals received would 
be based on the rates already agreed upon. These rates have essentially been reviewed in 
advance, and therefore DCAA, DCMA and Cost-Price Analysts could reduce the amount 
of work required in reviewing the proposal and reach conclusions more quickly. 
During 2009, the GAO (the DoDIG later concurred) released a very critical report 
on the status of the DCAA. Specifically, the report suggested: 
In consultation with DOD stakeholders, review DCAA’s current portfolio 
of audit and nonaudit services to determine if any should be transferred or 
reassigned to another DOD agency or terminated in order for DCAA to 
comply with GAGAS integrity, objectivity, and independence 
requirements.  
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As a result of the report, DCAA was no longer considered “independent” and 
therefore, DCAA ended all “non-audit” (examination level) engagements. My shifting the 
workload to only address examination-level procedures, the capacity of audits that can be 
produced has decreased, and the achievable turn-around time for the audits has increased.  
Additionally, it is not uncommon for a contractor to submit new rates several 
times per year. It is very difficult for FPRAs to be established when there is a “leap-
frogging” of rates, and the audits must be re-started. As a consequence, there have been 
numerous cases where the auditor could not opine on the rates because there were no 
established ones to work with as a historical cost baseline. In these instances, DCAA is 
left to simply verify the proposed rates to the contractor’s books and records. How does 
this ultimately help the PCO negotiated a contract? It does not, because once again, 
DCAA cannot offer an audit opinion. 
2. DCAA Auditor’s Perspective: Inadequate Proposals 
There are two very important procedures a DCAA auditor must complete when 
receiving a proposal. The first is to determine whether it adequately includes all the 
information required under the FAR, and the second is to determine the risk to the 
Government the proposal carries with it. Risk to the government is a balance between the 
value of the potential contract and the level of effort to be undertaken by the government 
in auditing it. We will focus on the former, however.  
The DCAA Contract Pricing Proposal Adequacy Checklist is used for assessing 
the adequacy of a contract price proposal in accordance with FAR Part 15, Table 15-2 
(Appendix A) and DFARS 215.408. The checklist assesses the adequacy of cost or 
pricing data. It consists of: 
1. General Instructions 
2. Cost elements (material, subcontractors, interorganizational transfers, 
direct and indirect costs, other direct costs (ODC), etc. 
3. Exceptions to Certified Cost or Pricing Data (commercial vs. non-
commercial) 
4. Formats for submission of line item summaries 
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3. Other 
The Contract Life-Cycle problem here is simple—If you accelerate the time 
between when the RFP is signed off and the proposal submission is received, you 
increase the chance that during the DCAA checklist process, the proposal will be deemed 
inadequate due to errors. When DCAA finds these issues, the proposal will be returned to 
the contractor as “inadequate,” and the contractor must incur more time and more 
proposal costs to revise the proposal and resubmit it. The procurement of that system 
essentially comes to a complete stop, thus increasing cost, schedule, and performance. 
The warfighter does not get the equipment needed to fulfill their mission and the 
American Taxpayer is now forced to pay more hard earned dollars to support the 
acquisition. It is a lose-lose situation. 
4. DCAA Auditor’s Perspective: Generally Accepted Government 
Auditing Standards 
One critical element that defines an “audit,” as mentioned earlier is that the final 
conclusion reached is based on a rigorous set of professional standards, known within the 
government as GAGAS. DCAA auditors are required to complete the DCAA Proposal 
Adequacy Checklist and perform a detailed risk assessment as essential elements of 
GAGAS-compliant audits. Of critical importance, the procedures performed must be 
documented, supporting a well written audit report that clearly expresses DCAA’s 
opinion on the proposal, and also encompasses quality and is free of mistakes. 
While GAGAS represents the government’s quality-control effort over audits, it is 
also chiefly responsible for creating major time and performance delays. A pricing 
proposal, for example, is an estimate of future work. The contractor submits the proposal 
with their costs based on one of the following:  
1. Historical, actual costs adjusted for anticipated future changes 
2. Anticipated costs based on the contractor’s experience and industry 
knowledge (when historical cost is not available) 
It is noteworthy to point out that some proposals have a period of performance of 
ten years or more, and even the very best estimates are inherently less accurate the further 
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out they are projected, due to the uncertainties in the business environment. When DCAA 
audits these proposals, auditors look at historical data, verify the proposed rates, review 
the consolidated bill of material (BOM), and look into the other cost elements based on 
our risk assessment. 
GAGAS-compliant audits and the related risk assessment usually take a very long 
time to complete. When working on the SV4 proposal, the PCO and Cost-Price Analyst 
requested an audit of the prime contractor from DCAA. DCAA provided an informal 
acknowledgment that they were beginning their audit, and would provide an estimated 
due date after the completion of their risk assessment. After a few months passed with no 
communication, the command contacted DCAA to follow up on the audit progress. 
DCAA informed them they were working on the risk assessment. After additional time 
had passed, the command followed up again, noting DCAA was still working on the risk 
assessment. Due to the significant amount of time spent on the risk assessment in its 
effort to be GAGAS compliant, the actual analysis of rates (referred to as “fieldwork” 
when completed at the contractor’s location) had not even been started. Before the field-
work portion of the audit can commence, the risk assessment must be reviewed and 
signed off by the supervisory auditor. After several months had passed and the audit was 
not formally initiated (specifically, a due date had not been formally established), the 
PCO decided to cancel the audit because it was taking too long for DCAA to complete. 
The obligation of funds limitation was on the horizon, and DCAA was unknowingly 
threatening the acquisition team’s budget authority. Rather than relying on DCAA as a 
team member, the decision was made by the PCO to use the Air Force’s in-house experts 
and perform its own “audit” to determine fair and reasonable rates. As one of the key 
requirements of a GAGAS compliant audit is “auditor independence,” it is clear that the 
buying command cannot perform a GAGAS-compliant audit of costs proposed to itself. 
The takeaway from this scenario is that the customer (Air Force) was not interested in 
obtaining a GAGAS-compliant audit, but rather they wanted an analysis of a fair and 
reasonable contract price in a timely manner. 
The Air Force and the other military branches do not have a lot of time to wait for 
things to happen. As soon as the RFP is released and proposal(s) is (are) submitted, 
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negotiation of the effort is usually about seven to nine months away. This means 
everyone on the Government team needs to work quickly and diligently. There is no time 
for wasted effort- muda- and there is certainly no time to wait for DCAA audits that will 
take several months to complete.  
F. IMPROVE AND CONTROL BUSINESS PROCESSES 
1. Consider Downstream Effects 
In the SV4 proposal discussed earlier, the main problem identified was that 
repeated revisions to the SOW created ripple effects that flowed downwards through the 
acquisition team resulting in increased costs, wasted time and wasted effort. While 
mission requirements are dynamic and change with each day on the battlefield, 
opportunity exists to eliminate the muda from the proposal process by, at a minimum, 
communicating the buying command’s intentions to the downstream acquisition team 
members. Once the Buying command sees the need for a revised SOW, the remaining 
elements of our “three-legged stool” should be immediately notified, such that the whole 
acquisition team may change direction like soldiers marching in formation rather than a 
mob running around in chaos.  
2. Necessity of GAGAS 
The other element identified in the discussed examples is the applicability of 
GAGAS. While GAGAS is a quality-control measure that provides validity to audit 
opinions, the contracting officers do not hold an interest in GAGAS-compliance. There is 
common ground between DCAA’s attempt at a near-ironclad audit opinion and the 
contracting officers’ need for timely results. As stated in Chapter II, an examination-level 
audit expresses the highest level of assurance that the subject matter is, in all material 
respects, presented in accordance with some criteria. In this case, the proposed costs are 
presented in accordance with the FAR-specifically they are reasonable, allowable and 
allocable. We also note, however, that there are multiple levels of assurance available. 
GAGAS chapter five provides two alternatives to an examination: Reviews and Agreed-
Upon-Procedures. Reviews offer a moderate degree of assurance, or “negative 
assurance,” and require a significantly smaller scope of work than an examination. 
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Agreed-Upon Procedures offer no assurance, but rather list out the specific procedures 
performed, and the results of each procedure. The question then becomes, has the value 
in a GAGAS-compliant Examination Audit been misplaced? These audits are being 
performed to establish a fair and reasonable contract price for the contracting officer to 
use in negotiations, not to audit for audit’s sake. If the Air Force feels, as in our above 
example, it can cancel its DCAA audit and accomplish its goals with its own analysts; did 
it really require a GAGAS-compliant examination-level audit opinion in the first place? 
Based on our research and observations, it seems apparent that there is a disconnect in the 
acquisition process between the goals of the buying command’s contracting officers, 
DCMA, and the products delivered by DCAA. It is highly inefficient to spend months or 
years of the acquisition schedule and hundreds or even thousands of hours in labor costs 
to deliver a product that is in excess of what was actually needed. Efficiency may be 
gained in this process by educating contracting officers on the levels of assurance that 
may be requested, and by reforming DCAA’s current policy of only performing 
Examination-level work (DCAA 2010).  
3. Suggested Solution: An Integrated Product Team Approach 
One solution to solving contract life-cycle issues explored at the Naval 
Postgraduate School is the establishment of integrated product teams (IPT’s). This type 
of team is not new to the DOD. In fact, agencies such as DCAA have had training on this 
topic dating back to the early 1990s. Defense Acquisition University defines an IPT as a 
“multidisciplinary group of people who are collectively responsible for delivering a 
defined product or process.” The team would consist of the representatives from the 
Buying Command, the contractor, DCMA, DCAA, and military technical experts, as they 
are all responsible for delivering the final product to the warfighter. Involvement of all 
team members throughout the process saves cost, schedule, and performance. These 
savings were identified in the CFI survey, when only 22% of buying commands chose to 
seek additional assistance from DCAA (in negotiations), with an 89% approval for those 
teaming results. 
One very visible example of the importance of IPT’s can be seen in NASA’s 
acquisition of the space shuttle Challenger. Nowhere in the acquisition process did 
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NASA pull together a functional IPT for the shuttle system. The three main elements of 
the shuttle were produced independently by three separate organizations (Thiokol, 
Rockwell, and Marietta). The IPT should have consisted of representatives from all the 
stakeholders, including Thiokol, Rockwell, Marietta, as well as NASA management, 
engineers, and end-users (Astronauts). The IPT would have discussed how the three main 
elements of the shuttle system interacted with one another, and addressed the impact of 
modifications to the system as a whole. As no IPT was ever assembled, discussions on 
the interconnectivity of the three parts and the related effects of independent 
modifications never took place. A simple o-ring joining two sections of the system 
together failed, and the entire shuttle system exploded 73 seconds after liftoff, killing all 
crew onboard and resulting in a total loss of the shuttle system and payload. A tragic 
allegory, we currently run the risk of the buying command, DCMA and DCAA producing 
their “parts” mostly independently of one another, with no formal or working IPT 
arrangement. 
One success story of acquisition-effort IPT’s occurred during the course of the 
aforementioned SV4 effort. The AEHF Space Segment (MCPG/SS) was the lead IPT 
responsible for the evaluation of the proposal with support from Aerospace, Linquest, 
DCMA and other government IPTs. A joint Government/Contractor process was used to 
develop and review task descriptions and discuss Basis of Estimates (BoE’s) in a series of 
formal integrated working group (IWG) sessions prior to formal proposal submittal to the 
Government. Each BoE was evaluated and an acceptable range of effort and direct costs 
was determined based upon critical technical review and subjective evaluation. As a 
result of using IPTs, an updated proposal was submitted to the Government and 
subsequently the prime contractor revised 84 of the total 116 BoEs resulting in the 
revised proposal. DCMA discovered during the fact-finding and evaluation process that 
20 of the prime contractor’s BoEs contained erroneous SV1, SV2 and/or SV3 actuals 
quoted as justification for the estimates. As a result DCMA issued a level 2 Contract 
Action Report (CAR) to the prime contractor demanding resolution of their errors in 
accounting system data. The prime contractor responded to the concerns by performing a 
full review of all 116 BoEs within the SV4 C1 proposal. The prime contractor’s review 
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revealed errors in a total of 84 BoEs resulting in a net $1.4M reduction in the proposal 
across all CLINs. The Government evaluated the updates against the SV1, SV2 and SV3 
actuals, applying engineering expertise to proposed labor tasks and schedules. This serves 
as a concrete example of how formalized IPT’s could work in the acquisition process. 
One of the most significant barriers to an effective IPT lies in GAGAS 
complications. Leading up to the release of the 2009 GAO report (GAO, 2009), a 
memorandum was issued by DCAA headquarters on audit guidance discontinuing the 
agency’s participation in IPTs (DCAA, 2008). According to this memorandum, the 
current independence mentioned in GAGAS “prohibits DCAA from auditing their own 
work or providing nonaudit services that are significant or material to the subject matter 
of audits.” There is a fine line between delivering a GAGAS-compliant audit report, and 
delivering what your customer actually needs. GAGAS Chapter Three states “Auditors 
and audit organizations must maintain independence so that their opinions, findings, 
conclusions, judgments and recommendations will be impartial and viewed as impartial 
by reasonable and informed third parties” (GAGAS 3.04). The question then becomes: 
independent from whom? GAGAS 3.05 goes on to answer this question, “…auditors 
should be independent from an audited entity during:…” We believe this clearly 
highlights the contractor as the organization from which DCAA must remain 
independent. Working with the buying command as an element of an acquisition effort 
IPT would not represent any impairment to independence. 
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The goal of our research was to identify the role of various entities in the 
acquisition process, determine their responsibilities, and analyze the workflow between 
these entities. We designed this research to focus on the acquisition process because 
while individual parts of the process are explored in great detail, we found a lack of focus 
on the overall process as a whole. Our goal was to answer one primary and five 
secondary research questions related to acquisition in order to gain a better understanding 
of the current responsibilities and goals of the acquisition entities. We hope this research 
will serve as a template for future studies of the efficiency and effectiveness of workflow 
across agencies within the acquisition process. Chapter I provided an overview of the 
study, as well as background information to establish the necessity of the research. The 
literature review in Chapter II examined data published by the GAO, DoDIG, DCAA, 
DCMA, DOD and USAF Space Command on history, responsibilities, performance 
metrics, future outlooks and challenges. In Chapter III, we performed our analysis of the 
data gathered in Chapter II by outlining and applying the Lean Six-Sigma framework to 
the acquisition process workflow. Finally, we then identified key constraints, reasons for 
the constraints, and offered a suggested solution for removal of the current constraints. 
B. CONCLUSION 
1. Research Findings 
Our study set out to answer the following question: 
1) Where does everyone fit in to the overall acquisition process? 
Based on our research, we observed that the acquisition process is governed by 
three main entities within the DOD- the buying command, DCMA, and DCAA- as well 
as external entities such as government contractors. Each of the three internal entities 
examined fit into multiple sections of the acquisition life cycle. We broke our research 
into subtopics, as follows: 
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Secondary 
2) What is each agency’s role? 
3) What is the key business process that drives the overall acquisition? 
4) How do the agencies interact? 
5) Are there opportunities for increased efficiency? 
First, we researched the history, mission and current state of affairs for each of the 
three acquisition entities. The DCAA serves and the DOD’s independent audit agency, 
and is tasked with performing audit and financial advisory services to its DOD partners. 
DCMA provides contract administration services to DOD partners with the goal of 
delivering products on-time and on-cost. The Buying Commands represent DOD 
acquisition programs authorized by Congress to make the obligations necessary to 
develop and acquire the assets needed to fulfill the national defense strategy.   
After walking through the acquisition life cycle, we observed that the forward 
motion from one phase to the next within the acquisition process is driven by the 
execution of contracts. We then deduced that the contract life cycle is the main driver of 
the acquisition process. We defined the contract life cycle in three parts: Proposal/Award, 
Performance, and Contract Closing. 
We then examined how the three agencies interact throughout the contract life 
cycle. During the contract award phase, the Command must draft an RFP, and may obtain 
assistance from DCMA. The proposals are received from potential contractors, analyzed 
by the Command’s cost-price analysts, and audited by DCAA. Then the Contracting 
officer negotiates and awards the contract. The next phase is the contract performance 
phase. In this phase, DCMA monitors the contractor’s performance on the contract, while 
DCAA monitors the contractor’s billings and billing rates. Finally, during the contract 
closing phase, DCMA and the Buying Command determine whether satisfactory contract 
performance has been achieved. DCAA, meanwhile, completes its incurred cost audits 
and provides the Contracting officer with an audit opinion on the allowability, 
allocability and reasonableness of the contractor’s claimed costs with respect to the FAR. 
The contracting officer and DCMA then use this data to close out the contract and 
authorize final payment. 
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We observed two specific opportunities for process improvement: 
1. The entities involved in the acquisition process should stop thinking of 
themselves as independent agencies, and start thinking of themselves as 
members of an acquisition team. We observed that the decisions and 
actions of each entity of the “three legged stool” has a direct flow-
down effect on the other two organizations.  By adopting an IPT 
approach to acquisition and establishing regular and consistent 
communication across the acquisition team agencies, the DOD can 
reduce much wasted labor effort and improve delivery dates across the 
acquisition life cycle.  
2. An IPT approach should serve to inform team members of the tools and 
services offered by each agency. Under GAGAS, there are information 
assurance options available beyond intensive, examination-level audits. 
DCAA must remain GAGAS-compliant, however improved 
communication between the contracting officer and DCAA auditors 
can more efficiently match the contracting officer’s needs with the 
product delivered by DCAA. This efficiency improvement could 
provide a drastic reduction in delivery time, and also a related 
reduction in costs. 
3. Educate the contracting officers as to the various levels of audit 
opinions covered under GAGAS, and the level of assurance associated 
with each. The goal is to more efficiently match the contracting 
officers’ goals with the work performed by DCAA. 
2. Recommendations  
Based on our research, we recommend that the DOD emphasize the acquisition 
community as a whole team. Every acquisition organization should be pushed to 
understand that they are one member of a larger team with the common goal of delivering 
a product to the warfighter. On a functional level, this concept should materialize in the 
formation of acquisition IPT’s consisting of representatives from the Command as well as 
DCAA and DCMA, meeting throughout the contract life cycle. Consistent, regular 
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communication on an IPT level from the very beginning of the contract life cycle will 
allow lead times and schedule bottlenecks to be identified early in the process. This 
teaming will also more efficiently match the needs and services of team members.  
From the moment funding is appropriated, the Contracting officer should form an 
IPT that includes not only technical and military representatives, but DCMA and DCAA 
staff. All three entities should have a place at the table beginning with the establishment 
of an acquisition schedule, through negotiations, and at contract closing. None of the 
agencies appear to have a good understanding of what the others’ responsibilities are, and 
this can be solved by working through the contract life cycle as a team.  
Additionally, the Acquisition community should consider the objective of their 
audit requests, and consider weighing the timeliness versus level of assurance decision. If 
the timeliness of a report is more critical to the KO than the level of assurance, such as 
for smaller or lower-risk contracts, the KO should request a review from DCAA rather 
than an examination-level audit. While a review only provides a moderate level of 
assurance, the level-of-work requirements are significantly less, and will allow the 
acquisition to avoid the bottleneck of an examination-level audit. With majority of non-
major contracts, timeliness affects the acquisition far more than the small audit 
differences uncovered by an examination. Conversely, a large or high-risk contract would 
benefit from an examination –level engagement, as large dollar amount may be 
questioned, and there will be a significant benefit from the elevated level of assurance. 
DCAA is currently making their version of an attempt at this risk-based approach by 
using a threshold of $1M to determine which incurred cost audits (DCAA programmed-
work) will receive examination-level audits. We suggest expanding this approach to non-
programmed work (requests received from the KO, such as proposals), and allowing the 
KO to determine the significance of the risk (relative to their program as a whole), and 
the level of assurance desired.  
C. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During our study, we focused on the proposal phase of the contract life cycle. The 
interaction between these three acquisition entities extends well beyond contract 
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proposals. We suggest future research of the business process flow between the agencies 
in the acquisition process expand to include other phases of the contract life cycle. While 
we believe the implementation of our IPT approach will solve many problems not even 
explored within our study, we believe further application of the Lean Six-Sigma 
framework to other areas of the acquisition process will yield similar results. 
We also were able to obtain significantly more data concerning DCAA and Air 
Force Space Command than DCMA. We encourage further research into the interactions 
between DCMA and its acquisition team members. Of note, many of the responsibilities 
formerly held by DCAA have been “passed off” to DCMA in recent years. As DCMA is 
not an audit agency, it begs the question of how their responsibilities could be 
interchangeable. Additionally, the authors found it unusual that DCAA currently reviews 
contractor’s billings, when that would appear to be a contract administration function 
falling under DCMA’s mission. Further research into the division of responsibilities 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
73 
APPENDIX A. FAR TABLE 15-2  
FAR Table 15-2: Instructions for Submitting Cost/Price Proposals When Certified Cost 
or Pricing Data Are Required 
 
I. — General Instructions 
 
A. You must provide the following information on the first page of your pricing proposal: 
(1) Solicitation, contract, and/or modification number; 
(2) Name and address of offeror; 
(3) Name and telephone number of point of contact; 
(4) Name of contract administration office (if available); 
(5) Type of contract action (that is, new contract, change order, price 
revision/redetermination, letter contract, unpriced order, or other); 
(6) Proposed cost; profit or fee; and total; 
(7) Whether you will require the use of Government property in the performance 
of the contract, and, if so, what property; 
(8) Whether your organization is subject to cost accounting standards; whether 
your organization has submitted a CASB Disclosure Statement, and if it has been 
determined adequate; whether you have been notified that you are or may be in 
noncompliance with your Disclosure Statement or CAS (other than a 
noncompliance that the cognizant Federal agency official has determined to have 
an immaterial cost impact), and, if yes, an explanation; whether any aspect of this 
proposal is inconsistent with your disclosed practices or applicable CAS, and, if 
so, an explanation; and whether the proposal is consistent with your established 
estimating and accounting principles and procedures and FAR Part 31, Cost 
Principles, and, if not, an explanation; 
(9) The following statement: 
This proposal reflects our estimates and/or actual costs as of this date and 
conforms with the instructions in FAR 15.403-5(b)(1) and Table 15–2. By 
submitting this proposal, we grant the Contracting officer and authorized 
representative(s) the right to examine, at any time before award, those 
records, which include books, documents, accounting procedures and 
practices, and other data, regardless of type and form or whether such 
supporting information is specifically referenced or included in the 
proposal as the basis for pricing, that will permit an adequate evaluation of 
the proposed price. 
(10) Date of submission; and 
(11) Name, title, and signature of authorized representative. 
B. In submitting your proposal, you must include an index, appropriately referenced, of 
all the certified cost or pricing data and information accompanying or identified in the 
proposal. In addition, you must annotate any future additions and/or revisions, up to the 
date of agreement on price, or an earlier date agreed upon by the parties, on a 
supplemental index. 
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C. As part of the specific information required, you must submit, with your proposal— 
(1) Certified cost or pricing data (as defined at FAR 2.101). You must clearly 
identify on your cover sheet that certified cost or pricing data are included as part 
of the proposal. 
(2) Information reasonably required to explain your estimating process, 
including– 
(i) The judgmental factors applied and the mathematical or other methods 
used in the estimate, including those used in projecting from known data; 
and 
(ii) The nature and amount of any contingencies included in the proposed 
price. 
D. You must show the relationship between contract line item prices and the total 
contract price. You must attach cost-element breakdowns for each proposed line item, 
using the appropriate format prescribed in the “Formats for Submission of Line Item 
Summaries” section of this table. You must furnish supporting breakdowns for each cost 
element, consistent with your cost accounting system. 
E. When more than one contract line item is proposed, you must also provide summary 
total amounts covering all line items for each element of cost. 
F. Whenever you have incurred costs for work performed before submission of a 
proposal, you must identify those costs in your cost/price proposal. 
G. If you have reached an agreement with Government representatives on use of forward 
pricing rates/factors, identify the agreement, include a copy, and describe its nature. 
H. As soon as practicable after final agreement on price or an earlier date agreed to by the 
parties, but before the award resulting from the proposal, you must, under the conditions 
stated in FAR 15.406-2, submit a Certificate of Current Cost or Pricing Data. 
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Total Number of Surveys 236 247 266 159 176 149 148 120
1 Was receipt of the audit report timely for the requestor's needs?  234 99% 234 95% 227 85% 132 83% 133 76% 125 84% 83 56% 69 58%
2 Did the requestor consider the audit report to be useful?  236 100% 246 100% 261 98% 152 96% 169 96% 141 95% 140 95% 117 98%
3 Did the customer consider the audit report sufficiently detailed? 235 100% 245 99% 259 97% 154 97% 166 94% 141 95% 143 97% 117 98%
4 Did the customer consider the audit report responsive to each item in the request? 236 100% 244 99% 259 97% 154 97% 162 92% 144 97% 142 96% 117 98%
5
Does the customer have suggestions for improving the report's usefulness and/or 
presentation?
5 2% 14 6% 23 9% 20 13% 27 15% 23 15% 19 13% 18 15%
6
Was communication (e.g., acknowledgement letter, timely coordination of issues that 
might delay audit, returning telephone calls, e-mails) between the FAO and customer 
considered sufficient?
235 100% 244 99% 251 94% 147 92% 155 88% 142 95% 137 93% 107 89%
7a
a. Did the customer request additional assistance after the audit report was issued (e.g. 
attendance at negotiations, further explain audit results)?
17 7% 39 16% 62 23% 39 25% 41 23% 46 31% 45 30% 26 22%
7b
b. If so, was the customer satisfied with the additional service?  If customer not 
satisfied, request specific information about the problem.
17 100% 35 90% 57 92% 32 82% 39 95% 39 85% 39 87% 20 77%
8 Was the customer satisfied with the overall quality of our work? 236 100% 246 100% 260 98% 153 96% 169 96% 143 96% 142 96% 119 99%
9
Closing Question to Interview - Are there additional DCAA (FLA or FAO) services 
that we can provide (not limited to audit just discussed)?
9 4% 13 5% 22 8% 16 10% 30 17% 28 19% 21 14% 7 6%
1st Half 2011 2nd Half 20111st Half 20091st Half 2008 2nd Half 2008 2nd Half 2009 1st Half 2010 2nd Half 2010
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APPENDIX C. INTEGRATED DEFENSE ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS LIFE 
CYCLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM  
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APPENDIX D. CONTRACT AWARD PROCESS  
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APPENDIX E. BILLING PROCESS 
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APPENDIX F. CONTRACT CLOSING PROCESS 
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